


JPRS-TAC-91-001
4 JANUARY 1991



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Arms Control

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-91-001

CONTENTS

4 January 1991

CHINA

- Antichemical Command, Engineering Institute Described [*ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE 11 Dec*] 1
- 'Yearender' on U.S.-Soviet START Talks [*RENMIN RIBAO 18 Dec*] 1

EAST EUROPE

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Voting on UN Disarmament Resolutions Explained [*NARODNA OBRODA 6 Dec*] 3
- Anti-Chemical Unit Ready for Gulf Deployment [*CTK 10 Dec*] 3
- Anti-Chemical Unit on Way to Saudi Arabia [*CTK 11 Dec*] 3
- Soviet Troop Withdrawal To Be Completed Jun 91 [*CTK 17 Dec*] 3
- Slovak National Council Chairman on Soviet Withdrawal [*Prague TV 21 Dec*] 4
- Last Soviet Unit Withdraws From Slovakia [*CTK 22 Dec*] 4

HUNGARY

- Soviet Forces Withdraw From Taborfalva [*Budapest Radio 13 Dec*] 5

POLAND

- USSR, Poland Hold Talks on Troop Withdrawals, Transit 5
- Talks Open [*PAP 11 Dec*] 5
- 2d Round of Talks Ends [*Warsaw Radio 12 Dec*] 5
- Polish Chief Delegate Comments [*PAP 12 Dec*] 5
- Partial Agreement Reached [*Warsaw TV 16 Dec*] 6
- Preparations for Soviet Troop Transit Noted [*D. Fedor; GAZETA WYBORCZA 12 Dec*] 6
- Minister Details Plans for Soviet Troop Transit [*PAP 18 Dec*] 7

LATIN AMERICA

BRAZIL

- Ban on CW Manufacture Discussed With Argentina [*O GLOBO 14 Dec*] 8
- Second Stage of Satellite Launcher Tested [*O GLOBO 22 Dec*] 8

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

IRAQ

- Salih Reportedly Threatens Using Chemical Weapons [*Paris Radio Monte Carlo 22 Dec*] 9

PAKISTAN

- Foreign Minister on Indian Missile Program [*Islamabad International 24 Dec*] 9
- Editorial Criticizes Indian Arms Buildup [*THE PAKISTAN TIMES 27 Dec*] 9

SUDAN

- Insurgent Group Alleges Iraqi IRBM's in Country [*Radio SPLA 23 Dec*] 10

SOVIET UNION

GENERAL

Update on Troop Withdrawals, INF Elimination	[O. Moskovskiy; TASS 1 Dec]	11
Akhromeyev Reaffirms Central Control Over Nuclear Arms	[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 8 Dec]	11
UN Conference on Disarmament Meets in Moscow	[IZVESTIYA 10 Dec]	11
International Accords on Global Arms Sales Urged	[Moscow Radio 14 Dec]	12
Yazov on Nuclear Testing, Nuclear, Conventional Arms Cuts	[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 21 Dec]	13

START TALKS

Supreme Soviet Deputies Find 'Encouraging' Outlook	[Yu. Kosinskiy; IZVESTIYA 5 Dec]	13
Defense Committee's Ochirov: Treaty 'Almost Ready'	[L. Timofeyev; TASS 10 Dec]	14
Ochirov Foresees No 'Insurmountable Obstacles'	[B. Sopelnyak; TASS 12 Dec]	14

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

General Ivanov Details Military Use of Space	[V. Ivanov; IZVESTIYA 12 Dec]	15
--	-------------------------------	----

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Foreign Ministry Official on CFE Cuts	[S. Tarasenko; NEW TIMES No 48, 27 Nov-3 Dec]	17
Ambartsumyan, Britvin Address Vienna Talks	[I. Melnikov; PRAVDA 5 Dec]	18
Contrasting Views on CFE Treaty Impact Assessed	[I. Vladimirov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 Dec]	18
New Stage of CSBM Talks Begins in Vienna	[V. Smelov; TASS 12 Dec]	19
Talks on Troop Withdrawal From Poland Held		19
Expected To Be 'Difficult'	[V. Nikanorov; PRAVDA 12 Dec]	19
Talks End	[V. Burbulis; TASS 12 Dec]	20
First Round of CFE Talks End in Vienna 14 Dec		20
Further Force Cuts Envisaged	[V. Smelov; TASS 13 Dec]	20
Grinevskiy Views Talks	[V. Smelov; TASS 12 Dec]	20
Committee Supports CFE Treaty Ratification	[TASS 14 Dec]	20
General Chervov Assures CFE Treaty Compliance	[Moscow International 15 Dec]	21
Chervov on Equipment Shifted East of Urals	[O. Moskovskiy; TASS 20 Dec]	21
Foreign Ministry Official on Military Doctrine	[V.L. Chernov; Moscow Radio 20 Dec]	22
MFA's Churkin on CFE Treaty Data Accuracy	[TASS 21 Dec]	23
Ground Forces Chief of Staff Discusses Equipment Shifts		23
[M. Kolesnikov; Moscow International 26 Dec]		23
East Europe Troop Withdrawal Second Stage Complete	[O. Moskovskiy; TASS 27 Dec]	24

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

U.S.-Soviet 'Rapprochement' on SNF Talks Seen	[V. Bogachev; TASS 20 Dec]	24
---	----------------------------	----

NUCLEAR TESTING

Kazakhstan Bans Nuclear, CBW Testing	[KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA 28 Oct]	25
Kazakh President Warns Against Nuclear Testing	[Moscow Radio 23 Dec]	25

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

NATO, CSCE Conferences To Help Asian Security	[A. Biryukov; TASS 19 Dec]	25
Talks with PRC on Border Force Reductions End		26
'Friendly, Businesslike Atmosphere'	[TASS 21 Dec]	26
Chinese Foreign Ministry Comments	[Beijing XINHUA 22 Dec]	26

WEST EUROPE

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

NATO Accuses Soviets of Cheating on CFE Data	[Paris AFP 18 Dec]	28
--	--------------------	----

BELGIUM

Coeme Proposes To Withdraw Troops from Germany by 1995	[Paris AFP 13 Dec]	28
--	--------------------	----

FRANCE

Navy Escorts Greenpeace Out of Nuclear Test Zone	[Hong Kong AFP 11 Dec]	28
Greenpeace Mururoa Radioactivity Claim Dismissed	[Melbourne International 20 Dec]	28

GERMANY


Scale of Ex-NVA Munitions Disposal Detailed	[E. Heckmann; WEHRTECHNIK Oct]	29
Disarmament Monitoring Satellite Plans Advanced	[F. Thelen; WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE 16 Nov]	31
Major Arms Maker Feeling Disarmament Pinch	[Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 30 Nov]	32
Disarmament Control Center To Open 1 April	[ADN 13 Dec]	33
Newspaper Alleges Secret U.S. Poison Gas Depot	[SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 14 Dec]	33
Problems Scrapping NVA SS-23 Missiles Noted	[SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 22-23 Dec]	33

NORWAY

Impact of CFE Agreement on Tanks Detailed	[O.T. Storvik; AFTENPOSTEN 20 Nov]	34
Bosterud's Stance on Minimum Defense Viewed	[O.T. Storvik; AFTENPOSTEN 3 Dec]	35

PORTUGAL

CFE Cascading, National Defense Discussed	[H. Santos; O JORNAL 2 Nov]	36
---	-----------------------------	----



Antichemical Command, Engineering Institute Described
HK1712053890 Beijing ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE
in Chinese 0636 GMT 11 Dec 90

[Report: "China Institute of Antichemical Command and Engineering Ranks Among Three Major Antichemical Institutes in the World"—ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE headline]

[Text] Beijing, 11 December (ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE)—With 40 years of unswerving efforts, the China Institute of Antichemical Command and Engineering, reputedly the cradle of the Chinese Army's training for its antichemical personnel, has ranked first of its kind in Asia, as well as one of the three major antichemical institutes in the world, with its professional training strength and a complete range of subjects.

Over the years, adhering to its institute guiding principle of meeting both the needs of strengthening the Army during peaceful times and carrying out future wars; and taking a road that combines teaching, scientific research, and production, the institute has turned out nearly 20,000 professionals who have become the backbone of China's antichemical construction.

Antichemical undertakings currently occupy a very important position in building the Army. With the development of nuclear and chemical industries, emergency rescue in nuclear and chemical accidents has increasingly aroused people's attention. It has become one of the institute's major tasks to serve the national economic construction. In the past two years, the institute has made great progress in its research on handling urban chemical contingencies, including more than 10 research projects on the subject of averting and handling chemical factory leaks alone. Once an accident occurs, the institute is able, within 40 seconds, to find out the pollution's scope, key area, and endangering extent and work out appropriate emergency rescue measures. The institute is also responsible for various kinds of work, such as quarantining the imported-exported food and testing water pollution. The gas mask developed by the institute has also reached the top international level.

Currently with two major departments of antichemical engineering and antichemical command; and 13 subjects including antichemistry, nuclear, and chemical information; maintenance of technical facilities; and chemical analysis, the institute aims at bringing up junior- and intermediate-level commanding officers, as well as intermediate- and senior-level engineering and technical professionals; and providing its achievements and experience to the antichemical warfare corps in terms of combat training, scientific research equipment, and academic research. In addition, the institute also has helped Third World countries train their antichemical personnel and, at the same time, has carried out extensive technical exchange with visiting counterparts from more than 10 developed countries.

'Yearender' on U.S.-Soviet START Talks

HK2312020990 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
18 Dec 90 p 7

["Yearender" by staff reporter Zhang Qilin (1728 0796 2500): "Present State and Prospects of U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Talks"]

[Text] Washington, 18 December (RENMIN RIBAO)—Great progress has been made in U.S.-Soviet nuclear talks in 1990; hopefully, a U.S.-Soviet treaty on reduction in strategic offensive forces [START] will be initiated in the foreseeable future. However, from the angle of the global tasks of nuclear disarmament, the treaty's initialing will only be a first step toward nuclear disarmament for the two sides.

"Progress in Nuclear Talks in 1990"

Through compromises between the United States and the USSR on several occasions in 1990, solutions have been found to the major leftover disputes from previous nuclear disarmament talks; for example, the USSR no longer insisted on the principle of mutual contacts on the relationship between nuclear disarmament and restricting strategic defense, thus pushing forward the progress of nuclear talks.

On several important issues concerning the nuclear treaty, both sides have agreed to make specific stipulation on sea-based cruiser missiles and air-based cruiser missiles, namely, no stipulation is made in the treaty regarding sea-based cruiser missiles exceeding a range of 600 km, while each side will announce the number of such missiles in deployment in their restrictive policy statements, with the volume not exceeding 880; air-based cruise missiles exceeding a range of 600 km will be excluded from the ceiling for warheads as stipulated in the treaty; however, the number of cruise missiles on each U.S. bomber is calculated at an average of 10, whereas it is an average of eight on each Soviet bomber, which are lower than actuality.

The two sides agreed upon the USSR improving its SS-18, increasing the number, and improving the qualities of its "Backfire" bombers; while the United States agreed to make some restrictions on transferring its Tridents to the United Kingdom. With solutions to those disputes, relevant U.S. officials believe, the treaty is likely to be completed early next year.

Bush has recently announced a visit to the USSR in this coming February; hopefully, the two countries' leaders will sign this treaty.

"Long and Arduous Progress"

The progress made this year in U.S.-Soviet talks has been a continuation of the struggles and compromises between the two sides over the years. Strategic nuclear disarmament talks have gone through a long and arduous progress since they began in 1982. The talks have been conducted under a backdrop of a large-scale nuclear

arms race between the two sides for over a decade, with nuclear weapons exceeding saturation; and aimed at reducing the size of their nuclear arsenals to lower the intensity of their nuclear confrontation.

In view of the changes in the world situation and the voice for nuclear disarmament in the world, both the United States and the Soviet Union have made strategic readjustments, while each side has taken a position of safeguarding its own strength, while reducing the other's advantages. The talks met with difficulties from the very start.

Reviewing the whole course of the U.S.-Soviet talks, we find a marked characteristic was that the ups and downs in the talks were closely connected with the two sides' argument and compromise in two arenas: Both sides have placed the key on cutting but of the other side's nuclear weapons that have some advantages, and whether the talks should be linked to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI].

Over the past eight years, the talks have largely gone through three stages. In the first stage (between February 1982 and November 1983), both sides held different views, and the talks were bogged down in a stalemate. As soon as the United States deployed its new-type Pershing I in Europe, the Soviet Union walked out of the talks.

In the second stage (between March 1985 and December 1988), with Gorbachev taking office, there was a turn for the better in U.S.-USSR nuclear talks. In December 1987, the two sides signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty, which pushed forward the progress of the talks. In between, differences remained in their ideas of reducing strategic forces, but the two sides still succeeded in reaching a principled agreement on cutting their nuclear weapons by 50 percent. We may put it that during this stage, a general framework for the treaty of reduction in strategic forces had already taken shape. The third stage of nuclear talks began in June 1989 in the wake of Bush taking the presidential office. Through 18-month efforts and compromises, the remaining major differences in nuclear talks were gradually resolved.

"Signing the Treaty Is Only a Matter of Time"

Viewing U.S.-Soviet relations at present, both sides hope to sign a treaty to stabilize the balance of their nuclear forces for the time being. At the Malta and Washington

summits last year, the two countries' leaders expressed the hope of signing a treaty by the end of 1990, but their hope has not been fulfilled.

An analysis attributes the cause of the failure to the two sides' bargaining. In addition, both U.S. and Soviet senior leaders have been busy handling important home and foreign affairs, dividing their energies. However, viewing the decision that the U.S. and Soviet leaders are to meet in Moscow in the coming February, signing the treaty on strategic forces is only a matter of time.

"The Treaty Is Just a Beginning"

Reviewing the progress of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear talks, both sides have made some concessions, with the USSR making bigger ones. According to the treaty's stipulation, the two sides will maintain their relative balance in nuclear forces. From the worldwide angle of nuclear disarmament, the treaty has marked limitations. This being the case, even though the treaty is signed and implemented, it only shows that they have made an initial step on the long way to nuclear disarmament.

First, the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals remain huge after the reduction. According to a U.S. research institute's data, the United States possesses 1,864 strategic vehicles for its three types of nuclear weapons, with some 12,300 warheads; while the USSR has only 2,536 vehicles, with some 11,500 warheads. Based on the treaty's stipulation, both sides will cut back the number of their vehicles to 1,600, and warheads to 6,000. The treaty makes allowance, however, for sea-based cruise missiles, which will be excluded from the ceiling; in addition, a peculiar way is adopted in calculating the number of warheads of cruise missiles carried on bombers and other nuclear warheads (namely, a way of calculation whereby the results are lower than actuality). This being the case, the number of warheads in U.S. and Soviet actual possession far exceeds the ceiling stipulated in the treaty, which can be approximately 10,000 and 8,000 respectively.

And second, the treaty has evaded other controversial issues. Therefore, the initialling of the treaty on reduction in strategic nuclear forces does not mean the conclusion of U.S.-Soviet nuclear talks.

Although the East-West relations will continue to develop in the direction of relaxation, neither the United States nor the USSR will easily give up their huge nuclear arsenals and advantages. Hence, the arduousness in their future nuclear talks.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Voting on UN Disarmament Resolutions Explained

AU1112075490 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA
in Slovak 6 Dec 90 p 4

[CTK report: "New Approach by the CSFR"]

[Text] New York—On Tuesday [4 December], the plenary session of the UN General Assembly passed a whole "package" of resolutions on questions of disarmament. As opposed to the past years, the CSFR delegation in most cases abstained from voting. Czechoslovak Deputy Zdenek Nejedly explained this new approach to some aspects of disarmament in his speech. He pointed out that the CSFR does not reject the idea of disarmament but rather the stereotypical, often archaic confrontational language of these resolutions, and their often unrealistic content. "We have placed in the foremost place in our disarmament endeavors that which in our opinion is closer to reality than the unrealized wishes of long standing. It is the same line of thinking as in our contemporary politics, be it domestic or foreign," Deputy Z. Nejedly said.

Anti-Chemical Unit Ready for Gulf Deployment

LD1012174290 Prague CTK in English 1629 GMT
10 Dec 90

[Text] Prague, December 10 (CTK)—All equipment and some 170 members of the Czechoslovak anti-chemical battalion are expected to be in Saudi Arabia within five to seven days, CTK was told by Lieutenant-Colonel Adolf Turek, deputy commander of the U.N. peace forces department of the Czechoslovak Army Chief of Staff Foreign Relations Administration, in Slany near Prague today.

Members of the special unit were visited today by Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel shortly after delivering a speech in the Federal Assembly (parliament) this morning. He underlined their humanitarian mission and its broad international significance.

Adolf Turek said that the transport of soldiers and equipment to Saudi Arabia by U.S. C-5 Galaxy planes will start at Prague Ruzyně Airport tomorrow morning. A total of three C-5 Galaxy planes are expected to take off. The transport is financed by Saudi Arabia.

The Czechoslovak unit is going to the Gulf at the invitation of Saudi Arabia to provide anti-chemical protection and aid in the event of the outbreak of war in the region. Its dispatch has been approved by Czechoslovak parliament.

Anti-Chemical Unit on Way to Saudi Arabia

AU1312151290 Prague CTK in English 1612 GMT
11 Dec 90

[Text] Prague, December 11 (CTK)—The first of 61 vehicles from a Czechoslovak volunteer anti-chemical unit were loaded into the belly of a C-5 Galaxy this morning and shortly after 1100 were on their way to Saudi Arabia.

Two more flights are scheduled for today and by the end of the week there will be 13 planeloads of equipment and personnel ready to proceed to their temporary station, some 450 km from Riyadh.

"The decision to send this unit was made because we all know very well what the use of chemical weapons means," said Czechoslovak Army General Chief-of-Staff Foreign Relations Administration Commander, Brigadier General Jiri Jindra. The 170 troops will be subdivided into three anti-chemical groups and one medical group, the rest will be maintenance.

"The unit's task for the time being will be to instruct Saudi Arabian soldiers and to familiarize the civilian population with protective measures against weapons of mass destruction", said Jindra.

Brigadier General Josef Cerny said that all three antichemical groups will be supplied with soldiers who have degrees in chemistry, in order to compensate for the fact that none of the volunteers have any military experience.

The Czechoslovak anti-chemical team are being sent to the Gulf region at the invitation of Saudi Arabia.

Soviet Troop Withdrawal To Be Completed Jun 91

LD1712225990 Prague CTK in English 2125 GMT
17 Dec 90

[Text] Prague, December 17 (CTK)—Soviet troops are being withdrawn from Czechoslovakia in keeping with the fixed timetable, with sufficient goodwill and trust on both sides, chairman of a Czechoslovak parliamentary commission supervising the withdrawal Michael Kocab said in Milovice, northeast of Prague, today.

So far more than 72 percent of the Soviet troops (53,000 people) stationed in Czechoslovakia have already left and there still remain about 20,500, 15,000 at Milovice itself. All rocket-launching equipment and war helicopters have been withdrawn, as well as 90 percent of artillery, 88 percent of tanks, 80 percent of aircraft and 70 percent of automobiles.

Members of the commission, who visited the Milovice base, were interested mainly in ecological problems. A representative of a Prague geological firm detecting the extent of contamination within the military zone said that some Soviet guards have been preventing men from

pumping contaminated water from trial holes. A litre of water has been found to contain two up to three millimetres of aircraft fuel.

Members of the commission and the command of the Soviet troops agreed that the Soviet side would evacuate an airfield near the base for dumping contaminated soil and would provide Czechoslovak ecological experts access to the affected districts.

The last Soviet soldier will have left Slovakia when a garrison at Roznava, East Slovakia, is withdrawn on Saturday, December 22. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia is to be completed by June 30, 1991.

Slovak National Council Chairman on Soviet Withdrawal

*LD2212000590 Prague Television Service in Slovak
2147 GMT 21 Dec 90*

[Text] I welcome here in the studio Slovak National Council Chairman Frantisek Miklosko who is going to say a few words in connection with an important event in the Slovak Republic.

[Miklosko] Dear fellow citizens and friends! Tomorrow, 22 December 1990, the last Soviet troops will leave Slovakia. It is noteworthy that Slovakia is the first country in Eastern Europe which tomorrow thus becomes, formally, a sovereign republic. This represents the end of an era for us. After difficult years, the normalization which began with the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968 is thus coming to an end.

I will not presume to make an assessment of the period of normalization. The year 1968 was, in a way, prepared by the intellectuals, journalists, and artists, and it was that section of society which was then persecuted most for 22 years in all respects. That was one of the most difficult periods of intellectual stagnation and apathy which has ever existed in this state and nation, and the question is how long it will take us to get over its consequences.

Tomorrow the Soviet troops are going home. What should our inner feelings be as we take our leave of them? Anger, indifference, incredulity? I recall an incident from November last year which has remainly deeply entrenched in my memory. An elderly lady came onto the rostrum in a square packed with several hundred thousand people in an unforgettable atmosphere. She was the mother of Danka Kosanova, who was shot by Soviet soldiers in August 1968. She did not make a grand speech; she simply said three words: We forgive you. Then the whole square repeated the same words in a whisper: We forgive you.

If I, the speaker of the Slovak parliament, wished to say something similar today, I would not dare to, neither would I have the right to say these words on behalf of those who suffered most. However, since they were

spoken by the mother of the young girl who died for no reason on the steps of Comenius University, I silently respect these words as if they were an order.

Let me wind up with one observation. The 18 or 20-year-old lads who are leaving us tomorrow had nothing to do with the occupation in 1968; neither—fortunately—did they have anything to do with the political system or policy of the Soviet leaders of the time. They are going home to difficult conditions.

What do we want to say to them in farewell? Perhaps just that here in Slovakia we make a clear distinction between the Marxist ideology which has held sway in that country for seventy years and between the ordinary Russian man. We have parted company once and for all, we hope, with Marxist ideology, but we wish to keep up our friendly relations with the Russian people in the future too. Perhaps those could be our final words.

Last Soviet Unit Withdraws From Slovakia

*LD2212172390 Prague CTK in English 1419 GMT
22 Dec 90*

[Text] Roznava, East Slovakia, December 22 (CTK)—The last Soviet unit, an artillery regiment based at Roznava, left the territory of the Slovak Republic today. It is being moved to the Belorussian town of Slutsk.

Only several hundred Soviet officers and soldiers now remain in this eastern region forming about one-third of Czechoslovak territory.

This completes the second stage of the withdrawal of Soviet forces which have been stationed in Czechoslovakia since the August 1968 Soviet invasion. The rest of the troops is to be withdrawn by next June.

According to Miroslav Sychra, deputy chairman of the Czechoslovak Parliamentary Commission overseeing the Soviet withdrawal, 54,450 Soviet soldiers and officers, i.e. 74 per cent of the troops, and 77 per cent of civilians have left Czechoslovak territory.

All launching equipment and anti-aircraft defence equipment has been withdrawn, 40 per cent of aircraft, 36 percent of them combat aircraft and 28 per cent of tanks and helicopters are still to be pulled out. No major problems have been encountered except for some delays in the removal of ammunition from the largest ammunition dump in Europe at Kvetna u Policky in East Bohemia but the situation there also improves.

Talks continue on damages and an agreement is to be signed next January. The facilities at Roznava have been taken over by Czechoslovak troops and a Czechoslovak regiment is to be moved there.

Commander of the Central Group of Soviet Forces Colonel-General Eduard Vorobyov has told CTK he believes "that relations between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia will develop on the principles of friendship, mutual understanding and bilateral advantages".

HUNGARY

Soviet Forces Withdraw From Taborfalva

*LD1312133590 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 13 Dec 90*

[Text] The Soviet troop withdrawals from Hungary are continuing according to schedule. The scene of one event today is Taborfalva, from where Pal Varga sent a telephone report.

[Varga] The Taborfalva artillery division is saying farewell. According to the Soviet troop withdrawal plans the Kecskemet region's Taborfalva artillery division of the Southern Army, temporarily posted in our country, will leave the country today.

The military ceremony began at 1130 at the Taborfalva railway station, where in the presence of the members of the Hungarian Parliament Defense Committee, senior representatives from the Soviet Embassy in Budapest, and military and air attaches from several diplomatic missions, railway trucks loaded with Katyusha multiple rocket launchers, artillery shells, and other military equipment are at the time of our program ceremonially being sent on their way toward the Soviet border.

On the train, the last 70-80 Soviet soldiers and officers stationed in Taborfalva are also leaving for home. The Soviet barracks in Taborfalva will become virtually empty. Only a few guards are left behind. Within days, they will hand over the barracks to Hungarian authorities.

I have heard it said that the Soviet military leaders would not have made such a ceremony of today's Taborfalva departure had they not, at the same time, also been saying farewell to their former chief, chief of the Southern Army Group, Colonel General Burlakov. However, they are saying goodbye because Burlakov has been relieved of his present post and at the same time had been appointed chief of staff of the Western Army Group. I understand that already tomorrow he will be travelling to Germany.

His successor will be Lieutenant General Victor Shilov, who was greeted by Hungarian military leaders with undisguised pleasure here on Taborfalva, because they are hoping that they will be able to come to a better understanding with him about the disputed financial questions surrounding the Soviet troop withdrawal.

POLAND

USSR, Poland Hold Talks on Troop Withdrawals, Transit

Talks Open

*LD1112130990 Warsaw PAP in English 1204 GMT
11 Dec 90*

[Text] Warsaw, December 11—Polish-Soviet negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland

and the transit through the territory of Poland of the Soviet troops temporarily stationed in Germany started here today with the participation of representatives of Poland's Foreign Ministry, Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources.

2d Round of Talks Ends

*LD1212204890 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
1800 GMT 12 Dec 90*

[Text] The second round of Polish-Soviet talks on the subject of withdrawing Soviet troops from Polish territory has ended.

[Begin recording] [Wladyslaw Plaszynski, head of the Foreign Ministry's Press and Information Department] The talks took place on a specialist level. The subject was not the date of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. Since this issue was raised by Poland, we want Soviet troops to leave our country by the end of next year, and we await a reply at an appropriately high level. The treaty on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland has in effect been agreed, [words indistinct] agreement on certain formulae. There is one fundamental issue. This operation must be paid for by the Soviet side. We do not know what the level of payments will be, since we do not yet know the number of transports: how many lorries and what type.

[Reporter] Will the Polish side have any control whatsoever over transports which will be leaving from here?

[Plaszynski] The whole operation will take place under the control both of the Army and the militia. [as heard] Customs services will also be included within this control, since we must be certain that what is being transported across Poland does not endanger her citizens. Part of the cargo, especially [word indistinct] dangerous ones, will most certainly be transported by sea. This is an exceptionally difficult and complicated operation, particularly the transit operation. Regarding the withdrawals, this involves not more than around 50,000 people. [end recording]

Polish Chief Delegate Comments

*LD1312065590 Warsaw PAP in English 2323 GMT
12 Dec 90*

[Text] Warsaw, December 12—We have worded over 90 percent of the text of a treaty on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, thus, a considerable step has been made forward, chairman of a Polish delegation, director of the Department of Europe at the Foreign Ministry Grzegorz Koszewska-Zorbas said after the end of Polish-Soviet negotiations held here on Dec. 11 and 12.

He added that both sides did not differ much with regard to still unsettled issues, the date of the withdrawal of Soviet troops being the most important of them. So far this issue has not been discussed during negotiations as it

should be solved by the heads of the governments or states concerned. The Polish side continues to propose late December 1991 for this operation, and it has informed the Soviet partner on its stand.

The sides also exchanged views on the basic principles of the transit of Soviet troops via Poland. They have already prepared preliminary drafts of a treaty in this respect, to be discussed in Moscow next January.

It is in the interest of Poland that the decision on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland be made before or at the time of Poland giving its consent to the transit of USSR troops moving from the former GDR. Koszowa-Zorbas stressed. For the transit operation cannot begin before the operation of withdrawal. For some time both operations will be simultaneous, and payments for them will be similar. So far no sums have been agreed upon, moreover, they have not been discussed yet, he said.

Practically, the only concrete figures have been mentioned in the Soviet draft, and they are 11 thousand railway convoys and three thousand columns of vehicles.

Partial Agreement Reached

LD1612201190 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1830 GMT 16 Dec 90

[Excerpts] Two days of Polish-Soviet negotiations on the transit of Soviet troops returning from Germany have taken place in Warsaw. The next round of talks will take place in Moscow in January. [passage omitted]

The Soviet side has proposed that military trains use four [figure as heard] routes: Gumience-Braniewo; Koszowa-Skadawa; (Kunowice-Czeremcha i Zasieki)-Dorohusk. Poland has accepted this proposal. [passage omitted] We can expect the passage of hundreds of convoys of heavy military vehicles. Such a convoy can be up to seven kilometers long and moves very slowly. Soviet authorities have proposed two routes: the northern one, i.e.: Kolbaskowo-Szczecin-Elbag-Kaliningrad Oblast, and the southern one, i.e., Olszyny through Lower Silesia and Lublin Voivodship to Dorohusk. Poland has agreed to the northern route only, and the Soviet side has noted this. We don't yet know which part of the Soviet Army withdrawn from Germany will be transported by air or sea. It, however, has already been established that all dangerous cargo will only be transported by sea, beyond our territorial waters. [passage omitted]

Preparations for Soviet Troop Transit Noted

AU1812111390 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 12 Dec 90 p. 7

[Dariusz Fedor report: "A Great but Expensive Retreat?"]

[Text] About 370,000 Soviet troops (if one includes families and civilian staff, the number is closer to

900,000), presently stationed in Germany will leave during the next four years. The almost 50,000-strong Soviet Army group stationed in Poland is scheduled to leave for the USSR before the end of 1991. The height of the transiting troop traffic—controlled throughout the length of the route by the Polish Army and other services—will occur in the years 1991 and 1992.

Poland wants the bulk of the troops and equipment that is to be withdrawn from the former GDR, to go by a sea route. According to the Polish Government, the rest could be transited through Poland by rail and only in exceptional cases should road convoys be used.

The transport of dangerous materials (this means chemical, bacteriological, and toxic weapons that have been stockpiled in the former GDR) will not be allowed and no nuclear weapons will be transported through Polish airspace, or by Polish rail or road, stated Grzegorz Koszowa-Zorbas, deputy director of the European Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

During the coming four years it is anticipated that 11,000 trains will transit Poland (eight trains every 24 hour period, because of the limited reloading capability of the Soviet side.) The Soviet Union will pay Poland about \$16,000 for each train. Four rail transit routes have been set out:

- Szczecin, Szczecinek, Malbork, and Braniewo;
- Koszów, Pila, Bydgoszcz, Torun, Olsztyn, and Karsze;
- Kunowice, Poznan, Kutno, Skierniewice, Pilawa, Lukow, Siedlce, and Czeremcha;
- Tuplice, Glogow, Ostrow Wielkopolski, Tomaszow Mazowiecki, Deblin, Lublin, and Dorohusk.

The Polish side is insisting that the troops (several hundred in each train), should not carry weapons. These will be transported in sealed trains along with other military equipment. The trains will be totally "self sufficient" and it is not envisaged that they will need to stop on route. In the event of a breakdown, Polish Army units from local garrisons will provide the necessary security.

Before entering Poland, the trains will be inspected by Polish Army units, customs and environmental protection officers and sealed for the journey through Poland. The first check will be made in Germany before the troops entrain and it is possible that Polish Army units may also be present at this inspection.

Polish State Railways are capable of transporting foreign troops. Many rail routes are suitable for the transport of heavy military equipment and currently the railway has spare capacity, because freight traffic has fallen by 40 percent. It is expected that bottlenecks will occur at the Polish eastern border, where the transit trains will either have to be adapted to the larger Soviet rail track or the men and equipment reloaded into Soviet trains.

Road traffic—using the 450 km route from Kolbaskowo, Szczecin, Rawsko Pomorskie, Malbork, Elblag, to Braniewo—will also be inspected and sealed. It will transport weapons and heavy military equipment. Probably about 3,000 road convoys will be needed, but for the time being it is not known how many vehicles each convoy will have. The Polish side has suggested 200 vehicles, whereas the Soviet side wants 350. Poland will also earn money from this road traffic. The Soviet Union will probably pay \$1 billion towards adapting the roads and about \$280 per vehicle. Every road convoy will be piloted by Polish Army units (vehicles at the front and rear). All crossroads will be manned. In the towns, the police will be responsible for ensuring traffic flow. The Army will oversee the operation over the whole route. Transit time will be about 24 hours (average speed 20 km per hour), and rest points will be organized. There will probably be two—one at the Soviet airfield in Sulinow (near Szczecinek), and the other on a military base near Stargard Szczecinski or Malbork. Security at all the stops will be ensured by Polish Army units.

The road convoys are also intended to be "self-sufficient" and will not need to refuel in Poland. They will have their own food, medical provisions, and technical backup. Initial tests of load bearing capability of road surfaces, viaducts, and bridges are already being made and traffic volumes along the proposed routes calculated. The bottlenecks will be at the Kolbaskowo border crossing and around the towns in the Szczecin, Koszalin, and Pila Voivodships, because of the lack of town bypasses.

The Soviet Union will transport all dangerous materials by sea, but convoys will have to sail outside Polish territorial waters and be escorted by Polish environment protection officers to see that Soviet Army does not dump rubbish and other things into Polish waters. If Soviet ships have to sail through Polish fishing areas Polish pilots should also be on board. No payment is anticipated for sea transit, unless the Soviet Union charts Polish ships.

No agreement on the number of flights or payloads to overfly Polish airspace has been reached. It is certain that flights will conform to international agreements and that the Soviet Union will have to pay for using Polish airspace. Poland is insisting that all transit costs should be borne by the Soviet Union and Germany. This was discussed by Mazowiecki and Kohl at their meeting in Slubice and Frankfurt-am-Oder. All costs incurred must

be paid for. Otherwise, for example, we shall be forced to halt all traffic, stated Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas.

Minister Details Plans for Soviet Troop Transit

*LD1812182290 Warsaw PAP in English 1650 GMT
18 Dec 90*

[Text] Warsaw, December 18—About one million people, including 350 thousand Soviet troops and almost 150 thousand civilian employees, are to return, via Poland, to USSR in tune with the German-Soviet Treaty, Polish Vice-Minister of Transportation and Maritime Economy Witold Chodakiewicz told PAP today.

Chodakiewicz added that the Polish side offered far-reaching technical assistance in the time of the whole operation, during talks held in Warsaw recently.

Poland is ready to supply heavy-duty equipment and railway cars for the transportation of troops and military hardware. Polish authorities are reviewing the possibility of the use of the special rail route linking Katowice and Hrubieszow and taking advantage of a new border crossing station furnished with loading ramps and equipment necessary for the change of wheel tracks (the spacing of Soviet rails is wider than in Poland), said the vice-minister.

As far as the road transit is concerned, the only acceptable route is that linking the border town of Rosowko, near Kolbaskowo, north-western Poland, and the town of Braniewo, north-eastern Poland. The whole transit operation, planned to last for four years, must be preceded by appropriate engineering and road works.

All those works must be completed by September of next year. There will be less problems with the rail transit, we are already prepared to handle 8 to 12 military trains per 24 hours. As a matter of fact we have already handled 38 transit military trains bound for the USSR in tune with the international disarmament treaty. We expect to handle further 120 such trains still this year. In addition, each day two to three military trains with Soviet troops reach Braniewo from Czechoslovakia, said the vice-minister.

We expect that the signing with the Soviet Union of both treaties, one dealing with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland till the end of 1991 and the other with the transit of Soviet troops from Germany, planned for four years, will take place in January 1991, concluded Vice-Minister Chodakiewicz.

BRAZIL**Ban on CW Manufacture Discussed With Argentina**

*PY1512010290 Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO
in Portuguese 14 Dec 90 p 8*

[Text] Foreign Minister Francisco Rezek reported in Brasilia yesterday that Brazil and Argentina are negotiating an agreement to ban the manufacture of chemical weapons [CW]. Rezek said their objective is to provide greater domestic security for their citizens and to prevent private companies from producing this type of weapon, the use of which was banned by a 1925 Geneva convention.

Furthermore, the Brazilian Government wants to convey a message to the international community: Brazil is rigorously complying with the convention. It is also trying to undo the bad impression caused by the perception of Brazil as a supplier of military technology to Iraq when the Gulf crisis erupted. After stating that Brazil has no chemical weapons, Rezek justified the agreement.

Rezek said: It is better to establish rules before anything happens. Had we done this earlier we would have avoided the case of Brigadier Hugo Piva who, after leaving the Air Force, began to develop military technology for Iraq.

Second Stage of Satellite Launcher Tested

*PY2412163890 Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO
in Portuguese 22 Dec 90 p 25*

[Text] San Jose Dos Campos—Yesterday the Aerospace Technology Center (CTA) tested the second stage of the Satellite Launcher Vehicle (VLS). The successful test lasted 63 seconds and entailed burning 7,257 kgs of solid fuel loaded into a six-meter-long and one-meter-wide tube attached to a testing facility full of electronic sensors.

VLS Project Chief Jaime Boscov reported that the burn generated 60 atmospheres of pressure inside the tube and a propulsion force of 27 tons. A rocket loaded in a similar way could travel over 1,000 km.

CTA computers registered all test results. Technicians will now verify the quality of the materials used in the test and the operation of the rocket's in-flight altitude control system through the data on the behavior of the tubes that exhaust the gas resulting from the burn.

Next year the CTA will carry out two more tests of the second stage and will test the fourth stage. By the end of 1994, all parts will be integrated into a rocket capable of boosting a 150-kg satellite into orbit 800 km above the earth.

IRAQ

Salih Reportedly Threatens Using Chemical Weapons

JN2212173190 Paris Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic
1710 GMT 22 Dec 90

[Text] Following President Saddam Husayn's declaration that Iraq would not withdraw from Kuwait, Iraqi National Assembly Speaker Sa'di Mahdi Salih announced today in Baghdad that the Iraqi Army will use all types of its weapons to defend itself. He added that Iraq does not possess nuclear weapons but that chemical weapons are also effective.

Salih reasserted that Kuwait is Iraqi territory. He added: We will not give it up. He also pointed out that the Iraqi forces will not allow a lightning war, as President Bush believes. He also said: We are neither Panama nor Grenada, and we will make the war a very costly and protracted one.

PAKISTAN

Foreign Minister on Indian Missile Program

BK2412091290 Islamabad Overseas Service in English
0800 GMT 24 Dec 90

[Text] Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan has said Pakistan is taking practical steps to maintain and strengthen its defense preparedness to meet the challenges and threats posed to its security. He was making a statement in the Senate today on an adjournment motion moved by Professor Khurshid Ahmed regarding the Indian missile program and its implications for Pakistan. He said we are viewing with concern India's (?reported) missile development activity which is a grave threat not only to the security of Pakistan, but also to regional and international peace and stability as well.

The foreign minister assured that the government was conscious of its responsibilities to maintain a deterrent capability and the armed forces were fully alive to the need to adopt counter measures.

After statement by the foreign minister, the mover did not press the motion on the assurance that the foreign minister will consult the Ministry of Defense as to how to debate the issue in more details in the house.

Professor Khurshid Ahmed also did not press another adjournment motion after the statement of Sahabzada Yaqub Khan that no important documents relating to defense and security of Pakistan were found missing from the Foreign Office. The chair [speaker] asked the standing committee on information and broadcasting of the house to check the news items in question with the newspapers which carried it.

Editorial Criticizes Indian Arms Buildup

BK2712095490 Islamabad THE PAKISTAN TIMES
in English 27 Dec 90 p 4

[Editorial: "Indian Arms Buildup"]

[Text] Responding to an adjournment motion sought to be moved in the Senate, Foreign and Defense Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan said that Pakistan is genuinely concerned at the Indian military buildup and views it with a deep sense of anxiety. He said that the Indian Integrated Missile Development Programme has so far tested five missile systems of different ranges and during the recent past has advanced in anti-air missile technology which has been flight-tested. Sahabzada Yaqub Khan added that the advancement of India in missile technology has grave implications for regional stability, for India also possesses nuclear capability posing a potential security risk to Pakistan.

When India test-fired its Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), Agni, in May 1989 its Defense Minister said that "the potential to carry lethal warheads over long distances and deliver them with accuracy" has been acquired. Since then India has also test-fired short-range and land-to-surface [as published] missiles which pose a threat not only to Pakistan but targets as distant as 1600 to 2500 kilometres away. Ordnance factories in India have been multiplying over the years and tremendous headway has been made in armour technology. Kinetic energy piercing ammunition is being manufactured which can pierce through very thick armour. India seems to be going all out to develop its military muscle. It has one of the biggest standing armies and air forces in the world besides an over-sized navy comprising nearly 140 surface and submarine vessels and a variety of tactical and reconnaissance naval aircraft. As the recently retired Indian Naval Chief of Staff said, henceforth the emphasis of the navy would be more on sea control than on just defence. India's nuclear weapon manufacturing capability is no secret as it has produced several hundred kilograms of plutonium—enough to make 60 to 200 weapons. It also has the aircraft to deliver these warheads.

The way India is building up its offensive arsenal and posing a threat not only in the region but also beyond should be a cause of alarm for everyone. Given the stark problems of poverty, ignorance and diseases facing the region, such a huge arms buildup is highly disturbing. While the entire world is moving towards reduction in arms, the opposite is happening in our immediate neighbourhood. The funds which India is lavishly spending on the purchase and manufacture of weapons could well be devoted for the economic development of the country and ameliorating the lot of its impoverished millions. India's feverish arms build-up, by posing a threat to neighbouring states, also compels them to divert funds

from development to defence. What India is engaged in at present is only adding to the economic miseries of the region.

SUDAN

Insurgent Group Alleges Iraqi IRBM's in Country

EA2312213090 (Clandestine) Radio of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army in Arabic 1340 GMT 23 Dec 90

[From the "With the Sudanese Man in the Street" program]

[Excerpts] I wish you good health for all time during the country's celebrations of the glorious birthday [Christmas]. During these celebrations, we would also like to remind the Sudanese masses that they should be cautious, because another massacre may happen as was

carried out by Al-Bashir during the celebrations of Ramadan. [passage omitted]

Now to the last thing, Sudanese man in the street. It is very important that we warn the Sudanese man in the street that none of us know what will happen on 15 January in the Gulf. This arises from the recent warning issued to Iraq. It is better that you dig trenches in your houses, because Al-Bashir has made Sudan part of Iraq.

So in the event that anything happens in the Gulf, Sudan will not be able to avoid it. You know this, because in Sudan now there are Iraqi missiles to be used to hit Egypt and Saudi Arabia from behind should war break out. The Egyptians and Saudis and all the forces of different nationalities in Saudi Arabia are aware of this plan. So from now on you should understand this properly: that the junta has put Sudan into a mess, and unless another government comes in before the 15th to topple the junta, Sudan may not escape this mess.

GENERAL

Update on Troop Withdrawals, INF Elimination

LD0112112590 Moscow TASS in English 1109 GMT
1 Dec 90

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, December 1 (TASS)—“The Soviet side meets its commitments for the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe and Mongolia precisely and strictly,” deputy head of the main department of the Soviet General Staff Colonel General Herman Burutin told TASS.

As of December 1, more than 94,000 troops, more than 2,900 tanks, about 2,000 artillery pieces and 112 combat aircraft have been withdrawn from East European countries, Burutin said.

More than 9,200 troops, 1,260 tanks and 500 artillery pieces were pulled out of Germany, he said.

About 51,000 troops, more than 1,000 tanks, about 1,000 guns and 48 combat aircraft were withdrawn from Czechoslovakia, he said.

More than 31,800 troops, 630 tanks, 500 guns and 64 combat aircraft were withdrawn from Hungary. About 2,200 troops left Poland, he said.

The second state of Soviet withdrawal from Mongolia has been completed, the general said. One incomplete motorised rifle division and some units remain in Mongolia.

A total of 32,900 troops, more than 700 tanks more than 400 guns and 138 aircraft were withdrawn from Mongolia in 1990, he said.

The Soviet Union unilaterally reduced its forces by 400,000 troops in 1989-1990, he said.

A total of 20,500 tanks, 28,400 artillery systems and more than 1,450 combat aircraft were scrapped in the European USSR following the transition to defensive structures, he said.

A total of 26 submarines and 45 surface ships were scrapped in the navy, he said.

“In accordance with the INF treaty, 957 shorter range missiles and 823 medium range missiles were destroyed in 1990. The elimination continues,” Burutin said.

Akhromeyev Reaffirms Central Control Over Nuclear Arms

PM0712192990 Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 8 Dec 90 p 1

[Unattributed report under “Stop Press” rubric: “We Will Not Lose Control”]

[Text] Under no circumstances will centralized control over nuclear weapons and ammunition, including strategic, or over the control systems for these weapons be lost. An IAN correspondent was told this by Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, adviser to the USSR president and until recently chief of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff.

If there is concern about this in the West, even among competent people such as U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, Akhromeyev said, this is in all probability a result of an erroneous assessment of the present situation in the USSR and of the possibilities of control over nuclear weapons.

UN Conference on Disarmament Meets in Moscow

PM1312120790 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
10 Dec 90 Union Edition p 3

[TASS report: “United Nations and Disarming World”]

[Text] An international conference “The United Nations’ Role in the Sphere of Disarmament and Security: Evolution and Prospects,” organized by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), was held 4-7 December in Moscow. Eminent political and social figures, diplomats, and scientists from over 50 countries participated in it.

The basic theme of the forum was the globalization of disarmament through more active work on the part of the United Nations in the draw-down of the arms race now under way. It was stressed at the conference that the joint elaboration of a new “postconfrontational” agenda for multilateral disarmament within the UN framework has become necessary. Conversion, the socioeconomic consequences of disarmament, the ensuring of nonproliferation in all its aspects, and the affirmation of openness in the military sphere as a generally recognized international norm were among the problems that primarily demand the use of mechanisms of multilateral cooperation.

Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze received a group of participants in the conference on 5 December. Questions of increasing the United Nations’ output in the work of

turning disarmament into a global process were discussed in a free and open atmosphere. Shevardnadze stressed that globalization is designed to make irreversible the processes of real disarmament that initially began at the USSR-U.S. level and on the European Continent.

The USSR foreign minister confirmed Soviet readiness to reach a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and called on his interlocutors to use their political influence and intellectual potential to accelerate work on the convention on banning chemical weapons, and he advocated direct UN involvement in solving the problem of restricting international supplies of conventional weapons.

A.S. Dzasokhov, chairman of the Soviet parliament's International Affairs Committee, spoke at length about the role of the USSR Supreme Soviet in turning disarmament into a real factor of the Soviet Union's security and the insuring of international stability.

International Accords on Global Arms Sales Urged

*LD1512144290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1030 GMT 14 Dec 90*

[From the "International Situation—Questions and Answers" program, presented by Kazbek Basev]

[Text] [Basev] Three questions on arms sales have come in from Petr Fedorovich Anisimov, from the town of Korosten, Zhitomir Oblast. How can you reconcile our principled policy of reducing the arms race with sales of arms abroad, and specifically to Iraq? In what sections of the budget are these sales reflected? What amount of money do they amount to? And why does the Council of Ministers not account for these shipments to the USSR Supreme Soviet, and why does the press not cover these matters, either? Here is my colleague Vladimir Pasko to reply.

[Pasko] Let me begin at the beginning. Our policies of limiting the arms race and on arms sales do not contradict one another. We have to reckon with the realities. Weapons and armed forces remain for the time being the basis of security for the overwhelming majority of states. Our arms sales permit the countries that buy the arms to maintain their defense capability. I stress—defense capability. That means that we rule out the possibility of our weapons being used for the purpose of attack. Iraq is an example of this. Its aggression against Kuwait prompted an immediate halt of our deliveries of weapons to Iraq.

Now the question of what sections of the budget these shipments are reflected in. Arms sales are reflected in the article, "Financing of foreign trade: expenditure under state, banking, and commercial operations, non-repayable assistance to foreign states, and other spending as part of international links." A total of 26.4 billion rubles has been earmarked for this in the 1991 draft

budget. But that is the overall figure. You will not find in the draft exactly how much is earmarked under arms sales.

Glasnost has so far made a poor showing in these matters. This is also the reason for the absence of information in the press. True, certain steps have been taken to put these matters into the public domain. From what Minister of Defense Yazov has said, for instance, we already know that arms sales abroad are dealt with by the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As far as control is concerned, a Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Committee has been set up which, it is believed, should take on this function. We also know from a statement made by Minister of Foreign Affairs Shevardnadze that the government intends to draft and submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet special legislation regulating such sales.

All this indicates that the situation whereby decisions on arms sales are made behind closed doors, and without Supreme Soviet control, is no longer appropriate—and it is not just because we have started to count the money. The main thing is that secrecy is out of step with the policy we have adopted of democratizing our life. It also runs counter to the policy of boosting confidence toward us on the international arena.

But we also need to keep the following in mind. Trading in arms as such is not an unlawful business. The international legal basis of the trade is Article 51 of the UN Charter, which enshrines the right of all countries to individual and collective self-defense. In the 45 years since the Charter was adopted, however, much in life has changed. The number of arms exporters and the volume of sales have grown, and there has been a considerable change in the nature of the weapons themselves. Uncontrolled arms sales have in no small measure begun to encourage regional conflicts and poverty in the world.

At the first UN General Assembly session on disarmament in 1978, all the states that took part in it advocated talks to restrict the international arms trade. As the two biggest arms suppliers in the world, the Soviet Union and the United States held appropriate consultations. The search for common agreement on the arms trade, however, failed to get to the stage of negotiating decisions. In August of this year, Comrade Shevardnadze sent a letter to the UN secretary general, setting out our position on this problem. It is an extensive and detailed document. The main provisions are these. We spoke out in favor of an international convention on the restriction of the sale and shipment of weapons, and backed the United Nations to deal with this. We also proposed possible measures, which in our view could open up the prospect of a convention being drawn up.

You can read all this for yourself. The document was published in IZVESTIYA on 15 August. Overall, we believe that international accords are needed here. For our part, we confirmed our willingness for a dialogue on the limitation of conventional arms sales, both with the

United States and other states that supply arms on the one hand, and the states that acquire weapons and regional organizations on the other. It is our view that by mutually complementing and encouraging one another, efforts of this kind—bilateral, regional, and global—would promote the development of a productive negotiating process.

Yazov on Nuclear Testing, Nuclear, Conventional Arms Cuts

PM112150590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Dec 90 Second Edition p 4

[Report by A. Gamov: "Barbed Questions to Minister: D.T. Yazov Answers Journalists' Questions"]

[Excerpts] A meeting took place between Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR defense minister, and Soviet and foreign journalists during a recess between sittings of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies on 19 December. [passage omitted]

Answering journalists' questions about the future of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test range, Dmitriy Timofeyevich noted that the information that had recently cropped up in the press about our intending to detonate 18 nuclear munitions there in the next two years does not correspond to the truth, although this does not mean at all that we will not be using the test range. There is nowhere else to test certain kinds of weapons.

Imagine 100 missiles that have been on standby for 15 years. It is necessary to check to ensure that the munitions are capable of operating after such a length of time. For this test, detonations are essential. The Americans have detonated 300 more munitions than we have. The British also test nuclear weapons. The French and the Chinese likewise. We did not engage in this for 18 months solid. In all of 1990, we have carried out only one explosion on Novaya Zemlya. The third generation of certain kinds of nuclear munitions, which will operate on a completely different basis, is now undergoing development. And we must test them. [passage omitted]

Foreign news agency journalists were interested, above all, in the question of how much equipment we have shipped to the East. Surely they are not about to accuse the Soviet Union of breaching the treaty that has just been signed, observed the minister. When the subject of the talks was being worked out, D.T. Yazov remarked, we stated at the time that we had a certain quantity of equipment in our European section. Naturally, on withdrawing it from there we relocated it beyond the Urals.

In response to a request that he express his standpoint on the upcoming military reform, D.T. Yazov stated that reform has been under way a long time now. We have reduced the number of tanks in divisions. We are cutting the number of actual divisions and colleges and reducing the military academy intake. When we agreed with the Americans to reduce intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, we eliminated a whole missile army. If we

subsequently agree to reduce strategic offensive armaments by 50 percent, that means we will still be reforming our Armed Forces. [passage omitted]

START TALKS

Supreme Soviet Deputies Find 'Encouraging' Outlook

PM112151090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Dec 90 Union Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Kosinskiy report: "Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty: Outlook Is Encouraging"]

[Text] Geneva—In accordance with a decision by the USSR Supreme Soviet Committees on International Affairs and Questions of Defense and State Security, a group of USSR people's deputies have spent a week in Geneva, Switzerland.

The deputies' brief was to study progress in the preparation of the draft treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms, work on which is being completed at the Soviet-U.S. START talks which are currently being held here. Your correspondent asked USSR People's Deputies V.I. Ochirov and V.G. Afanasyev, members of the delegation, to give the results of their study of this question.

It is appropriate to begin with the main news: The Soviet-U.S. START talks, which have been going on in Geneva since 1985, are coming to an end. The beginning of 1991 is a realistic deadline for the signing of the future USSR-U.S. Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms. Thus there is a real chance that the treaty will be on the table at the talks between Presidents M. Gorbachev and G. Bush at the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit in Moscow.

The deputies assured us that this is not only their impression from studying the draft treaty and numerous other documents from the Soviet-American talks, but also the authoritative opinion of the heads of the USSR and U.S. delegations—Yu. Nazarkin and R. Burt respectively, as well as the numerous experts from the two countries commissioned to apply the final "polish" to the documents—the text of the treaty itself and a 500-page supplement comprising memorandums, glossaries, and so on.

So what will the Soviet Union and the United States gain if the optimistic forecast of a speedy conclusion to the work on the START Treaty proves justified? Above all, this document envisages a reduction of strategic offensive arms, and this will be expressed in the lowering of "ceilings" for launchers and nuclear warheads in the arsenals of each country. Accordingly, the number of delivery vehicles will be limited to 1,600 each and the number of weapons [boyezaryad] to 6,000 each. All remaining strategic arms above this level will be destroyed under strict mutual verification within seven

years. In the text of the future treaty, questions of monitoring are specified to the last detail.

Having studied in detail the whole set of documents prepared at the Geneva talks, the deputies are turning their attention to the fact that the still quite high levels of strategic arms remaining under the agreement do not entirely remove the danger of a nuclear war and, indeed, do not yet even ensure a 50-percent reduction of these weapons. They stress, however, that the political significance of the future treaty should not be underestimated insofar as the achievement of consensus and mutual understanding between the USSR and the United States on strategic offensive arms is an important key to solving problems of security. Success in the matter of strategic offensive arms reduction is also important to effectively curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons: It is only by setting an example for other states that the USSR and the United States can strengthen their confidence in the nuclear disarmament process.

The outlook for the conclusion of the strategic arms reduction treaty is wholly encouraging. However, the deputies who have studied this matter cannot conceal their misgivings as to the potential threat to the future treaty which may arise should the Persian Gulf crisis take a sharp turn for the worse.

Defense Committee's Ochirov: Treaty 'Almost Ready'

LD1012180790 Moscow TASS in English 1729 GMT 10 Dec 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Leonid Timofeyev from the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Press Center]

[Text] Moscow, December 10 (TASS)—A Soviet-American treaty on reducing strategic offensive arms (START) is almost ready, Colonel Valeriy Ochirov, a USSR people's deputy and member of the Soviet parliament, told a news conference here today.

Among a delegation of Soviet members of parliament he visited Geneva last week and familiarised himself with the course of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks between the Soviet Union and the United States.

It remains for the two sides to coordinate individual technicalities concerning telemetry and its coding, throwweight and verification, Ochirov said.

The signing of the START treaty, he emphasised, will become yet another stage on the way to an accord on further cuts in strategic types of weapons.

"We must have a fully prepared treaty by the end of December," Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov emphasised at the news conference.

The Soviet Union, taking realities into account, agreed for the future treaty to allow a certain degree of cooperation between the United States and Britain in the field

of missiles and missile technology because such cooperation has been maintained since the Second World War, Karpov told journalists.

The exception made for Britain as a third country envisages at the same time control on the part of the Soviet Union over the transfer of American Polaris and then Trident missiles to London, including the number of missiles, time and place of transfer, he said.

It is, virtually, a question of a tri-partite solution which would safeguard against the transfer of this type of armaments to third countries, Karpov added.

Speaking on the subject of non-proliferation of missile technology, Karpov said the Soviet Union is holding consultations with the United States, Britain, France, Germany and some other countries with a view to working out an international regime on the strength of the agreement concluded by seven European countries in 1987.

The Soviet Union, Karpov said, officially stated its readiness to join the regime if it will signify the Soviet Union's equal participation, including that in the exchange of information and technology which these countries share as COCOM members.

Ochirov Foresees No 'Insurmountable Obstacles'

LD1212151290 Moscow TASS in English 1450 GMT 12 Dec 90

[By TASS correspondent B. Sopelnyak]

[Text] Moscow, December 12 (TASS)—"The draft of a Soviet-U.S. treaty to reduce strategic offensive armaments is almost ready. Insurmountable obstacles to its signing are not foreseen. Several technical issues remain to be harmonised," said Valeriy Ochirov, deputy chairman of the Soviet parliamentary Committee on Defence and State Security.

He described the outcome of the bilateral talks in Geneva in a TASS interview on the results of a trip of a group of Soviet people's deputies to the Swiss capital.

The negotiations began in March 1985 and in October 1986, the sides reached agreement to halve strategic offensive armaments down to 1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000 warheads per side. They established qualitative parameters for these types of weapons.

Ochirov said that during the negotiations the sides succeeded in solving issues related to stages in strategic offensive armaments reduction, rules of counting Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (IBMs) and warheads on them, procedures for missile's re-equipment and verification measures to monitor compliance with the treaty.

Nevertheless, the USSR and the United States still have some disagreements concerning verification procedures. It was decided that permanent monitoring of two missile

production plants—one in the USSR and one in the United States—will be organized.

Soviet missiles leave the plant in the assembled form packed in containers, from which they are launched. Americans have a different technology to produce ICBM's. Therefore, the USSR proposes to have permanent monitoring of those plants that produce the first stages.

The principles of coding telemetry coming in from missiles after their launch is also a subject for discussion.

These and other issues should be coordinated at the meeting of the Soviet and U.S. foreign ministers in Houston. If common ground is found, the level of military confrontation between the USSR and the United States will be lowered and, moreover, trust between the two states in military-strategic relations will be significantly enhanced in the next 15 years—the term of the treaty.

"Alongside the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, signed in Paris recently, the treaty to cut strategic offensive armaments will become a bedrock of world stability and enable the USSR and the United States to boost cooperation and save considerable funds," Ochirov said.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

General Ivanov Details Military Use of Space

91UM0165A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Dec 90 Union Edition p 6

[Report on interview with Colonel General V. Ivanov by V. Litovkin; place and date not given: "Without the 'Secret' Stamp (For the First Time Colonel General V. Ivanov Describes the USSR Ministry of Defense Space Units)"]

[Text] All things are changing rapidly in our time. Several months ago we were preparing some materials for print that described the structure of the Soviet Armed Forces. A watchful censor's hand pasted pieces of white paper over the words "space units." No words to the effect that the existence of the units was no secret for anyone helped; the Law on Press did not exist then either.

Today we have the law and the unnatural stamp has been canceled...

[Litovkin] Vladimir Leontyevich, would you, the commander in charge of space units, tell us a few words about the history of your troops. When and for what purpose have they been created? What do they do?

[Ivanov] I want to make a correction right away. We are not troops, we are units. There is a basic difference in the names. Troops are armed with concrete weapon systems

and their purpose is to accomplish combat assignments. But units is the name for the groups that facilitate that task.

We are military people but we do not have weapon systems. We deal with launches of space devices, we provide their operation in near-space and other orbits. Our satellites and spacecraft and stations may be used, in their turn, for a variety of other purposes—scientific, economic, or military. The launch sites in Baykonur and Plesetsk, with their testing grounds and launch preparation units, as well as the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Space command, control and telemetry complex near Moscow, spacecraft tracking stations scattered from Brest to Kamchatka and the Kurils, and many other subsidiary services—they all come under our jurisdiction, if you will.

The history of our units started with the construction of launching sites, and with the creation of the Strategic Rocket Forces when our first domestically produced rocket, derived from the trophy V-2, was launched from the Kapustin Yar testing ground in October 1947.

Now we are launching Soyuzes, orbital stations, and other spacecraft. The system Energiya-Buran passed through our hands also. If you see people wearing shoulder-boards participate in space launches, you know that they are from the Ministry of Defense Space Units.

[Litovkin] That means that the crew that included a Japanese journalist was also launched by the military?

[Ivanov] Of course it was. The TBS [Tokyo Broadcasting System] TV company gave us, as a memento of the event, some of its equipment which will improve the performance of the Baykonur TV center considerably.

[Litovkin] If I understood you correctly, every machine sent to space by our country belongs to you primarily. That includes navigational systems, meteorological satellites, telecommunications satellites, systems for optical and electronics reconnaissance, and the ballistic missile early warning systems.

[Ivanov] No, that is not quite correct. It is true that no launch of any rocket, whatever equipment it might carry, can go without our participation. Moreover, we "keep track" of spacecraft in orbit and we process huge loads of working data. For that our units possess automated control systems, computerized complexes, high-speed computers capable of millions of operations a second and having a formidable memory; we have highly sensitive, very powerful electronics systems.

But we do not own everything that has been launched and put into orbit. For instance, ballistic missile early warning systems belong to the Air Defense Forces; we only lease several channels on the telecommunications satellites of which the USSR Ministry of Communications is in "charge".

[Litovkin] One more clarification, Vladimir Leontyevich. Can we say that your units are identical to SDI? And if not, can they be quickly transformed into such, if need be?

[Ivanov] At present, we and the SDI are two incompatible notions. I have already told you what our units are involved with. But SDI is primarily an all-government program of scientific and technological research, of design and experiments which aims to develop and test prospective weapon systems for anti-missile defense. Most of these systems are supposed to be deployed in space.

Our country has stated many times and at the highest levels that no placement of weapons in space can be allowed; we have stated our total disagreement with the expansion of SDI work. But the U.S. leaders and, primarily, their military-industrial complex did not give up the idea. The concept has already swallowed \$20 billion. Four hundred industrial firms and 28,000 leading scientists and experts are involved in this work, many of them are known to the whole world. If SDI work is expanded any further, our country will have to take certain countermeasures.

[Litovkin] Would it make sense to stop objecting to the SDI system but join the research instead? In this way we could end up with a world system of group security and control under the UN banner. I know that the United States suggested this idea to us.

[Ivanov] Yes, it did. But it wants to do it on a bilateral basis. The United States does not support the idea of creating a system of international security within the UN framework. The Americans think that it might become a political organization and that it would result in a transfer of the newest technologies in the area of space reconnaissance to our country and other countries. And this contradicts their interests.

But a "bilateral" cooperation would allow the United States to have an undisputable advantage in expanding their SDI work. The extent of our involvement in this work was not and is not as large as that of the United States. Therefore, we cannot talk to the Americans as equals, as the saying goes, in this respect; we would have to "disclose" to them a certain area of space to test the prospective ABM means. In other words, we would have to agree to a space missile and nuclear testing ground, to an international law basis which would help ignore the ABM agreement, to the possibility of testing and perfecting all the links of SDI in space. Such a step would undermine the security of our country and we could not agree to it.

The Americans have been able to determine the technical specifications of our ICBM's since 1987 anyway since we were conducting test launches to the Pacific Ocean areas. It would be unreasonable to give them such an advantage now.

[Litovkin] How much does our "military" space cost? Is it ready for the conversion?

[Ivanov] Last year we spent R3.9 billion on our space-related military programs. That is 55 percent of all the money our country spends on space research. This sum, as you know, is R7.9 billion. Our expenses, by the way, are covered by the Ministry of Defense budget.

On average it costs R8 to R12 million to build one spacecraft, depending on its type. It costs R7 million to launch it, to employ it in orbit costs some R2 to R2.5 million.

Is it much or is it little? It all depends on your point of view, on the way you compare it with something concrete. These are major expenditures, of course, especially now, given the present state of our economy. But let us make a comparison. The United States spends almost \$32 billion on space programs while 77 percent of that sum goes for military projects. Judge for yourself if we can afford to ignore this factor.

And here is another thing. The military space programs do not entail expenditures only, they also bring considerable profits to the national economy. The Ministry of Geology alone gets R50 million in profits with our help. We make it possible for 97 percent of our country's population to watch the First Program on TV, with our help 91 percent of the population can watch two of the all-Union programs. Reliable weather forecasts provided by just one satellite bring some 600 to 700 million in profits. Within the last five years we contributed around R2.6 billion to the state budget through the Ministry of Communications. We have a lot more possibilities than all this. According to calculations by our economists, our space meteorology, communications, and navigation alone can bring R25 billion in profits for our country within the next five years. But for that we need to design a comprehensive concept for the development of Soviet space programs.

I think that any conversion in a rule-of-law state should start with a law regulating it. We also need such a law and more than just this one. We also need a commercial plan; we need a financial framework specifying the rates for all the various "space services," including the interagency and international ones. This plan should provide allocations for the social protection related to military space programs. Maybe then our people will stop travelling from dormitory to dormitory or looking for a place to rent, they will have a roof over their heads.

We need a state program for our space work whether it concerns research, national economy, or the military. We are ready for it. It is the legislators turn now to say their word.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Foreign Ministry Official on CFE Cuts

PM0612173490 Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 48, 27 Nov-3 Dec 90 pp 15-16

[Article by Sergey Tarasenko, head of the Foreign Ministry Planning Department: "Tanks or People?"]

[Text] Major Selivanov said his was an opinion of a Soviet officer and citizen. Let me also speak as a diplomat and citizen. As a diplomat and citizen I advocate glasnost.

I have always been ashamed of knowing almost everything about the armed forces of the United States, simply by virtue of my ability to read in English, and nothing about the armed forces of my own country, because no information about them has ever appeared in Russian.

I also feel shame that as a diplomat I had to take part in the doctoring of Soviet and American military statistics for the annual propaganda booklet *Whence The Threat To Peace*, making it look as if the United States is the threat.

I fully agree with Major Selivanov in the sense that we have to take a complete inventory of sufficient and surplus weapons and armaments.

Major Selivanov said something terrible when he mentioned that one NATO tank manned with professional soldiers could knock out 2 to 3 Soviet tanks operated by "amateurs." He was absolutely right when he noted that people will be the decisive factor in any battle, but he drew strange conclusions from his own words: we need more tanks. It seems evident to me that Soviet tankmen must be trained so that one Soviet tank could knock out at least one, or better 2 to 3, hostile tanks. Otherwise we will have to commit to battle two or three times as many men as the enemy. A simple scenario: one hundred NATO tanks are attacking us. To withstand we must have 300 tanks. If we fight to the last man, NATO will lose 400 men, while our losses will amount to 1,200 men.

I believe the success of any battle must be measured by sacrificed human lives, not knocked out tanks...

I love the song which says we shall spare nothing for victory. When the fatherland's fate hangs by a thread, nothing can be spared, but can we really plan to pay a price which is three times bigger than is necessary?

If the situation is really as Major Selivanov insists then we would have lost any battle with NATO anyway, because even at the height of our military presence in Europe (1988) 41,580 Soviet tanks deployed there and in the European part of the USSR confronted 30,690 NATO tanks. According to Selivanov we should have had at least 62,000 tanks to have a chance to end the battle with NATO in a draw.

When the situation with tankmen's training is so bad, there is no difference between 40,000 Soviet tanks confronting 30,000 NATO tanks or the East/West ratio lowered to 20,000 tanks on each side. We will not be able to win in either case. Moreover, the reductions will be beneficial for us because we will be able to train our tankmen better and to allot more diesel fuel for field exercises.

Major Selivanov cannot wait to know which advantages NATO will have after the reductions. Diplomats cannot answer this question because we do not know how many Soviet tanks have already been withdrawn from the reduction area. When they assembled in Paris to sign the treaty, the two sides were to exchange information on how many tanks they have in Europe. Only then will the diplomats learn what Major Selivanov demanded to know. I also want to know these statistics.

Military critics of Soviet foreign policy never miss a chance to use the argument which Major Selivanov used: The United States has 15 times as many aircraft carriers as the Soviet Union. But I can give an even more striking example: The Soviet Union has 36 times as many air defence planes as the whole of NATO.

If all the 15 U.S. carriers close in around Europe and a hundred planes take off from each carrier, which can never happen, this 1,500-plane strong Armada will be countered by 1829 air defence interceptors incapable of hitting ground targets (their official designation). In fact, I question this inability to hit ground targets: one such plane piloted by an officer, who was also the unit's political instructor, went berserk over Poland earlier this year. After the pilot catapulted, the plane flew as far as Belgium and crashed there killing a man and ruining a house. If piloted, it could have wreaked more havoc.

The fifteen US carriers proper will be attacked by 400 ground-based Naval Aviation planes, including 200 formidable Backfires: over 10 Backfires for each carrier.

Major Selivanov notes ironically that the Soviet Union's total ceiling of defence sufficiency is one of the highest in Europe.

I have to explain what is meant in this case: let us take tanks for instance. The 22 countries (NATO plus our allies in the Warsaw Treaty) will have a total of 26,700 tanks, the Soviet Union will have 13,150. The whole of NATO will have 6,800 combat planes, the Soviet Union will have 5,150 (plus the 400 ground-based Naval Aviation planes). By the way, this is a defence sufficiency level of 37 percent of the total ceiling of this category of weapons deployed in Europe. In no category do we have a sufficiency level lower than 33 percent.

Is it too little to have a military potential amounting to one third of the summary military power of all Europe plus the U.S. and Canadian forces deployed on European soil? Does Major Selivanov have any doubts as to the

ability of North America and Europe to produce as many weapons as will be necessary to ruin our economy totally?

Major Selivanov expressed one very correct idea: "Our people are wise enough to understand and accept any policy that does not contradict common sense and historical experience."

International treaties concluded by the Soviet Union are published in the press and submitted for discussion and ratification by the Supreme Soviet. Military build-up programmes are kept secret from the people and parliament. Who decides how many missiles, planes, tanks or guns we need? Why should the military fear telling the people what future they have prepared for it and what new hardships the people will be doomed to in the name of continued military build-up?

Major Selivanov is right: People are the decisive factor in any battle. That is why it is time we thought about homeless officers and poorly fed soldiers wearing inconvenient uniforms?

As a citizen, I grieve that in this country, a tank is considered more valuable than a human being.

Ambartsumyan, Britvin Address Vienna Talks

*PM1312145590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Dec 90 Second Edition p 5*

[Report by correspondent I. Melnikov: "Soviet Legislators in the Hofburg"]

[Text] Vienna, 4 December—The strictly working nature of the talks that resumed in Vienna a week after the Paris summit meeting was disrupted, if I may put it like that, by a visit by Soviet legislators. Academician Sergey Ambartsumyan and General Nikolay Britvin, members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, addressed an audience of diplomats and military experts in the Hofburg.

Legislators from the East and West have been in the Hofburg's halls before. But I cannot recall an occasion when they have been accorded a rostrum for talks. What did our deputies talk about? Academician S.A. Ambartsumyan welcomed the decision for an annual exchange of information on military budgets. Now is the right time, he emphasized, to define the prospects. The spread of confidence-building measures to naval activity in the bodies of water adjacent to our continent and also to the activities of air forces in Europe must acquire key significance.

N.V. Britvin, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions, drew the attention of the delegations of the 22 NATO and Warsaw Pact states to the need for the timely ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Contrasting Views on CFE Treaty Impact Assessed

*PM0612164190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Dec 90 First Edition p 3*

[Article by Colonel I. Vladimirov: "Security for Everyone; CFE Treaty in the Eyes of Western Experts"]

[Text] The Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty is still attracting universal attention. That is understandable. The history of civilization has not seen a treaty of this kind before. More than 120,000 units of various arms are to be eliminated in the vast area from the Atlantic to the Urals. No battle has brought about the destruction of such mountains of weapons. With the implementation of the treaty opportunities for a surprise attack or for wide-ranging offensive operations will virtually be ruled out for all sides. Henceforth security in Europe is to be ensured not by military but primarily by political means in conditions of cooperation rather than confrontation.

NATO political circles and the public in NATO countries have reacted with delight to the treaty. Delivering a government statement in the Bundestag 22 November, FRG Chancellor H. Kohl described it as a "most extensive and all-embracing agreement in the disarmament sphere." The chancellor believes that the treaty lays the foundation for "a new all-European architecture of security." Other heads of state and government involved in the work of the Paris meeting have made similar statements.

Before the national legislatures' ratification of the CFE treaty Western experts, military specialists, and leading strategic studies center and institute personnel are carefully analyzing the treaty's substance. The main question of most interest to them is what effect the treaty will have on the security of its 22 Warsaw Pact and NATO signatories. Will their defense capability suffer? Has anyone been hurt or has anyone, on the contrary, acquired palpable advantages?

It is being alleged that the NATO bloc has won a victory and has even changed the correlation of forces in Europe in its favor. The Soviet Union will, after all, have to cut back more arms than all the bloc's countries together. However, the USSR has frequently expressed its readiness to eliminate the existing imbalances and asymmetries and establish complete equality in the main types of conventional arms. It is clear from the mandate of the talks that the main aim was to remove the existing disparities in the European balance. That is why there can certainly be no question of the West's winning.

There are experts such as, for instance, P. Lelouche, the French specialist on military-political and military-strategic problems, who sees no comfort for NATO in the treaty provisions. Any positive consequences of their implementation, P. Lelouche claims, are canceled out by the fact that the Soviet Union will be the strongest military power on the European continent. Fueling fears

of the Soviet "military threat," he says that 70 percent of the cuts in the USSR's military potential in Central Europe will be made not by destroying military hardware but by transferring it across the Urals. From there—you never know—it is only a stone's throw to the Champs Elysees.

To be fair I must note that those people engaged in the quest for winners and losers are clearly in the minority. Objective approaches to and assessments of the treaty prevail. Most specialists regard the clearly-formulated, well-proportioned system of unprecedented verification measures, which virtually preclude any attempts to violate its provisions, among its obvious merits. In the opinion of specialists from the (London) International Institute of Strategic Studies, this system acts as a definite guarantee that a stable situation will be preserved in Europe, given the difficult reform processes under way in East Europe and the Soviet Union.

Many people in the West are in favor of further progress in European disarmament. Such problems as cuts in naval forces still remain outside the framework of the talks. In this connection the opinion exists that the mandate of the Vienna talks should be expanded to cover the naval aspect.

Moreover, hardly anyone expected the CFE treaty to resolve all Europe's military-political problems at a stroke. It is all the more important to embark on renewed debate without delay.

New Stage of CSBM Talks Begins in Vienna

LD1212182890 Moscow TASS in English 1819 GMT
12 Dec 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, December 12 (TASS)—The first session of a new stage of the 32-nation talks on confidence-building and security measures [CSBM] in Europe ended in the Austrian capital today.

The talks, which started immediately after the European summit in Paris, will continue until after the CSCE summit in Helsinki in Spring 1992. This is a transitional stage, in which all CSCE nations will have to switch over to a comprehensive solution of problems of confidence building, security and disarmament.

The current session paid much attention to setting guidelines for attaining qualitatively new positions in the military-political field.

The Soviet delegation believes it is important that confidence-building measures should cover the navy and air force, and limit the scale and intensity of military activity.

It proceeds from the fact that the naval factor becomes increasingly destabilising and cannot be left outside the

sphere of openness, given the conclusion of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the elimination of imbalances in armaments.

Talks on Troop Withdrawal From Poland Held

Expected To Be 'Difficult'

PM1312154190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
12 Dec 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report for PRAVDA by Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikanorov, of the USSR Defense Ministry press center: "Difficult Dialogue; In Spirit of Paris Accords"]

[Text] Moscow, 11 December—The second round of the Soviet-Polish talks on the terms of the presence of Soviet troops and their withdrawal from Poland began in Warsaw today (the first was in Moscow in November).

The draft documents prepared by the Polish side are to be examined at the present stage. The discussion promises to be difficult: The range of far from easy questions that have to be solved is very wide. In fact, the discussion will not just be about the Northern Group of Forces but also about transit via Polish territory for the Western Group of Forces being withdrawn from Germany. Full agreement on these issues has not yet been reached. However, the purpose of the talks is to elaborate a compromise decision through joint efforts.

As is known, there are no political obstacles to the unraveling of the complicated knot of problems associated with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Europe. But this does not at all mean that there are no technical or social difficulties.

The Northern Group is relatively small—two combined-arms divisions and some individual units. There are 605 tanks, 985 armored combat vehicles, 222 combat aircraft, and other equipment and armaments stationed there. And, of course, people. There are little more than 56,000 servicemen in all serving in the Northern Group. They are deployed mainly in northern and western regions of Poland, those which were part of the Third Reich before the war. Soviet soldiers arrived there when they were liberating Polish land from the fascists.

During the 45 years since the war new barracks, housing, training premises, and trade and consumer enterprises have been constructed there. They are all considerable material assets that cannot be removed overnight.

Incidentally, the NATO states, which are preparing to withdraw some of their units from German territory, face similar problems. According to the BELGA news agency, for example, the withdrawal from the FRG of part of the Belgian contingent, which currently numbers around 25,000 servicemen, could start in 1992 and take five years.

"A group of forces is mainly people," Colonel General A. Kleymenov, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces

General Staff and head of the Soviet delegation at the talks, stressed. "We must always remember this. Indeed, the current talks are about their future. Of course, these considerations are bound to influence our approach to deciding on withdrawal dates."

One would like to believe that another step will be taken at the talks in Warsaw toward mutual understanding and an accord that will contribute to the further development of relations of friendship and cooperation with our close neighbor in the common European home—Poland.

Talks End

LD1212222990 Moscow TASS in English 2116 GMT 12 Dec 90

[By TASS correspondent Vldas Burbulis]

[Text] Warsaw, December 13 (TASS)—Soviet and Polish negotiators ended two days of talks on the Soviet pull-out from Poland here on Wednesday.

The sides discussed the stationing and withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country and transit of Soviet troops leaving former East Germany through Poland.

The next round of talks will be held in Moscow in January.

First Round of CFE Talks End in Vienna 14 Dec

Further Force Cuts Envisaged

LD1312223590 Moscow TASS in English 2217 GMT 13 Dec 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, December 14 (TASS)—The first round of talks on conventional forces in Europe [CFE], which began immediately after the Paris summit, ended here today.

Negotiators, after discussing key directions for the talks, will focus, in the following rounds, on further conventional arms cuts on the continent.

They plan to reduce the number of troops in 22 countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO and agree on procedures for air inspections, stabilising measures to limit military activities and troop and weapons movement.

These issues are not covered by the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, signed in Paris.

Radical changes of the military-political situation in Europe call for new approaches, negotiators said.

Confrontation between the military alliances has practically ceased to exist. Many delegations said troop limits should be devised on a national basis, rather than by setting ceilings for groups of NATO and Warsaw Treaty member states.

The new round of talks is a bridge to new talks on disarmament, confidence-building measures and security that will begin after the CSCE Helsinki summit in 1992.

The Soviet Union, like many other states, believes that new talks, in contrast to current ones, will have a pan-European character, will cover a wider range of security problems in Europe and will involve all CSCE member states. The debate on naval forces should get a proper place on the talks' agenda, Soviet diplomats said.

Grinevskiy Views Talks

LD1212230190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1148 GMT 12 Dec 90

[By correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Excerpts] Vienna, 12 December (TASS)—Moving toward a higher level of openness and predictability in the military sphere is the main task of the new round of talks on confidence-building and security measures in Europe, the first session of which closed in the Austrian capital today. [passage omitted]

It is important to achieve a situation, said Oleg Grinevskiy, ambassador-at-large and head of the Soviet delegation, whereby confidence-building measures spread to the naval and air forces and the scale and intensity of military activity are restricted. The Soviet delegation is constantly drawing the attention of the member-states to the factor of naval forces, which is acquiring an ever more destabilizing nature, and should therefore not remain outside the sphere of openness, taking into account the conclusion of a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe and the elimination of the imbalance in armaments in accordance with this document.

In conditions when the implementation of the aforesaid treaty is beginning and the documents adopted in Paris have altered previous ideas about military confrontation on the continent, the Soviet diplomat stressed, there are virtually no obstacles preventing the specific elaboration of all-embracing measures restricting military activity on the ground, on the sea, and in the air. All this would be an effective means for the further strengthening of European security, as well as an important step on the road to European unity.

Committee Supports CFE Treaty Ratification

LD1512031990 Moscow TASS in English 2229 GMT 14 Dec 90

[Text] Moscow, December 15 (TASS)—The foreign affairs committee of the Soviet legislature on Friday recommended that the USSR legislature ratify the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty.

The committee, which is in session for the second day, also studies the treaty on the final settlement with

respect to Germany and several other treaties and agreements regulating the USSR's bilateral relations with Germany, France and Italy. The committee will continue to study them to make a decision on their ratification.

During the discussion, which involved representatives of other legislative committees and commissions, several Soviet ministries and agencies, speakers pointed out that the submitted documents were testimony to the end of the cold war era and confrontation.

People's deputies focused on ensuring the security of the Soviet Union in new conditions and developing cooperation with leading European states.

General Chervov Assures CFE Treaty Compliance

*LD1512132390 Moscow World Service in English
1210 GMT 15 Dec 90*

[Text] The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed a little more than three weeks ago, still seems to give doubts to some as regards the intentions of the sides. Western mass media in particular write about divergent interpretations of the information about the installations subject to control on the territory of the Soviet Union. Doubts are hardly compatible with the honest realization of the commitments assumed under the treaty, especially when it comes to the preparation of future agreements. So, how many installations does the Soviet Union have for control as outlined in the Paris treaty? Our reporter put this question to General Nikolay Chervov, a consultant to the chief of the Soviet Army's general staff, and this is what he said:

[Begin Chervov recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] In one of his interviews during the negotiations, the chief of the general staff, Moiseyev, said that the Soviet Union has about 1,500 installations subject to control in its European part, but after the signing of the treaty the figure diminished to 895. I'll explain why this happened.

First of all, the structure of our Armed Forces has changed, and consequently the number of installations. The figure 1,500 was quoted in the process of the preparation of the treaty. The criteria for the definition of the installations were not clear at the time. Now the installations where there is personnel, and there is no military equipment or armaments, fall out of the treaty's definition. Secondly, a number of units and formations were disbanded in the process of the unilateral reduction of troops. The Americans and their allies now ask us about the whereabouts of the Seventh Tank Division withdrawn from the Western Army grouping. They ask us why we didn't include that division as an installation subject to control. The thing is that the Seventh Tank Division was moved to the Soviet Union's territory, disbanded, and its personnel was demobilized. Its new tanks were transferred to Siberia. So why control a division that doesn't exist any longer? Besides, exempt from that control were military training centers that have

fewer than 30 units of armaments and equipment, and thus do not fall under the treaty's definition.

And finally, part of the installations were qualified as not liable to control because their armaments and military equipment were crossed out from the restriction list in keeping with the treaty. In short, we are in no position to hide anything, and we're not going to do that. Our partners in the treaty can demand an impromptu control at any point and at any facility on the territory stretching up to the Ural Mountains. We raise no objection. Let them go ahead with that control.[end recording]

The Soviet Union acts strictly within the limits of the treaty, and will do so in the future, the consultant to the chief of the general staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, General Chervov, said in conclusion.

Chervov on Equipment Shifted East of Urals

*LD2012142590 Moscow TASS in English 1332 GMT
20 Dec 90*

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, December 20 (TASS)—“The withdrawal of Soviet hardware to beyond the Urals, particularly tanks, should in no way cause concern among Western experts,” Colonel-General Nikolay Chervov, assistant to the chief of the Soviet Armed Forces' General Staff, told TASS here today.

He was responding to a campaign being stepped up by Western media to bring about an atmosphere of distrust of peace moves by the Soviet Union, which is withdrawing its hardware from Europe to beyond the Urals.

As of July 1, this year, the Soviet Union had 41,500 tanks in its European section, Chervov said. By the time the Paris Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was signed (November 19, 1990), the Soviet Union had only 20,725 tanks in its European section.

Chervov said that during the implementation of the Soviet defensive military doctrine, 10,000 tanks were subject to cutbacks. During the unilateral reduction in the Soviet Armed Forces by 500,000 men, another 10,000 tanks were cut. As a result, Chervov said, 20,000 tanks were withdrawn from Europe by the beginning of the CSCE summit. Chervov said that 8,000 new tanks out of the amount were transferred to rearm troops in the Asian part of the USSR. Another 8,000 tanks are, for the time being, at Siberian storage depots. Yet another 4,000 tanks have already been scrapped or converted into auxiliary vehicles.

“The main thing now is to attain the ultimate levels of arms recorded in the CFE treaty for each group of states and for each individual country,” he said.

The rest depends on experts and inspectors, he added. Everything may be inspected: basic data on armaments, verified figures following ratification, cutbacks (the

places of elimination and conversion and places of storage), and ultimate levels of arms throughout the tenure of the CFE Treaty.

"In the European part of the USSR, every day there will be at least one inspection by western experts. Therefore it will be impossible to conceal anything in disarmament matters under these conditions. Fears concerning the Soviet Union's steps to reduce its armaments are absolutely unfounded," Chervov said.

Foreign Ministry Official on Military Doctrine

LD2012110890 Moscow Domestic Service
in Russian 0530 GMT 20 Dec 90

[Interview with Vladislav Lvovich Chernov, head of the Administration of General Disarmament and Military-Political Doctrines of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by Vladimir Pasko; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Pasko] The Paris agreements by the countries participating in the pan-European process have become a stimulus for the preparation of new steps with the aim of ensuring that the military doctrines of NATO and the Warsaw Pact fully accord with the principles of defensive sufficiency. The processes taking place in this sphere are interesting and very promising. At the same time, the statements of some of our people's deputies show that not everyone comprehends the essence of what is happening. This is what Vladislav Lvovich Chernov, head of the Administration of General Problems of disarmament and Military-Political Doctrines of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs says.

[Chernov] Transformations on the European continent [word indistinct] key changes. This is especially clearly demonstrated, for instance, by the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, concluded in Paris, which, three years and four months after it comes into effect, will lead to a qualitatively new situation in Europe, characterized by an equality of forces, the cutting of military potentials, and the reduction of their offensive capabilities. This opens up paths to the revision of the conceptual premises on which European security has been based since the time of the cold war.

But if one is to talk about the Western countries, then after the London Declaration, after the Paris summit, and all this time in Brussels in NATO circles, work is going on on the revision of the most dangerous, as it were, concepts of confrontation with the East; directions, so to speak, of the creation of such forces with regard to volume and quantity of structure and deployment which we would perceive as creating a threat to the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. In particular, one may say that it is a question of [Chernov changes thought] and specific decisions are being taken on the gradual cutting of foreign troops on the territory of the FRG, above all. It is a question of the rejection of a program of modernization of tactical nuclear weapons. Finally, it is a question of restructuring the whole NATO

defense structure on a non-offensive footing, and, specifically, questions concerning what should be done by both sides, the East and West, in addition, so that their military doctrines completely reflect those changes which are taking place on the continent.

This will be under discussion at the seminar—the second seminar—on military doctrines, which will take place within the framework of the talks on confidence-building and security measures in the spring.

During the signing of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, the parties exchanged the most detailed information on their armed forces. They may already carry on a concrete conversation on what is necessary at a practical level so that military doctrines correspond to an even greater extent to the declared defensive objectives.

[Pasko] As far as I understand, this necessity has been brought about by the fact that, in the Paris treaty the parties agreed that the defense potential of each country must not exceed a third of what is located in the area from the Atlantic to the Urals.

[Chernov] Yes, this is the so-called rule of sufficiency which was introduced into the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe. You have expounded the essence of this rule quite correctly. The objective of the introduction of such a limitation is that no single state in Europe should be able to dominate it militarily, so that military might becomes more balanced across the continent. This rule is just from the point of view of the creation of a new security system.

If you raised the ceiling to, let us say, not one third, but 40 or 50 percent, then this new concept of European security would disintegrate, since such a concentration of military might on the continent within the framework of one country would resurrect the old concerns of other states. A new polarization of forces between us would occur with all the political, economic, social, and military consequences returning from this. I think that here a real threat to our security would arise, which those who do not want parity, or want to live by the principle that fear equals respect, do not realize.

The accord on principles of sufficiency means that no one country should have an offensive potential, which means at least a threefold excess of forces in comparison with those who are a potential enemy. This leads to the necessity that countries go over in their practical actions to defensive doctrines.

I want to add that by defensive sufficiency a much more extensive complex of measures is envisaged, concerned, so to speak, with the bringing of armed forces in line with the defensive principles of military doctrines. But the rule of sufficiency which fixes a ceiling on the number of forces is one of the first steps in the direction of the realization of the concept of defensive sufficiency.

[Pasko] That is, extremely great practical tasks confront the diplomats now?

[Chernov] Well, diplomats are impotent here without, as it were, military specialists. We are counting on the closest cooperation with the Ministry of Defense and the general staff in working out the concept of defensive sufficiency and a military doctrine which corresponds to the present situation in the world and looks to the future. The problem is that events in Europe especially are very far ahead of our work. We must react as rapidly as possible. There is much ahead. Above all, we must get away from the thinking that developed in confrontation.

MFA's Churkin on CFE Treaty Data Accuracy

LD2112170290 Moscow TASS in English 1649 GMT
21 Dec 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Igor Pleskov]

[Text] Moscow, December 21 (TASS)—“Parties to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty are now embroiled in the dispute on the accuracy of data on the number of weapons and military equipment limited by the Treaty and also verification facilities within the area covered by the Treaty, exchanged by the signatories,” Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vitaliy Churkin said at a briefing here today.

Churkin said work to clarify and compare data was being conducted in the joint consultative group that was formed under the CFE Treaty to solve disputable issues and iron out differences.

“Because of the vast amount of data, the figures supplied by many countries, including the Soviet Union, contained many technical inaccuracies,” Churkin said. “The first stage of this work is planned to be completed by February 19—the date by which the sides should present clarified data.”

“To solve promptly the most sharp issues related to discrepancies in the sides’ assessments of the supplied data, the USSR and the United States conducted bilateral consultations at the level of experts,” Churkin said.

“The first meeting of the group of experts was held at the Soviet Defence Ministry on December 6. The dialogue was continued in Houston within the framework of Eduard Shevardnadze’s visit and involved Soviet military experts.

“Bilateral and multilateral consultations showed that all issues related to the swap of data can be solved and settled within the time-frame established by the Treaty. The USSR is interested as much as other countries in creating an atmosphere of confidence around the Treaty, an atmosphere that rules out the emergence of doubts regarding the strict observance of the Treaty. We are prepared to continue work to validate the declared data

both within the framework of the joint consultative group and on the bilateral basis.

“The question arose about a re-deployment of part of our armaments beyond the Ural Mountains,” Churkin said. “This re-deployment is implemented outside the context of the talks, within the framework of the unilateral move to reduce the USSR armed forces in Europe and withdraw our military contingents from East European countries.

“We have repeatedly supplied information on this score to Western partners. Part of the military hardware moved beyond the Urals will be destroyed or converted to civilian uses. Part of the equipment will be supplied to troops in Asia and part—as replacement stock for armaments that are being phased out.

“The replaced equipment will be destroyed or diverted to peaceful uses. The Soviet Union does not have any plans to set up military groups on the basis of the re-deployed equipment beyond the Urals,” Churkin said.

Ground Forces Chief of Staff Discusses Equipment Shifts

LD2612155290 Moscow World Service in English
1310 GMT 26 Dec 90

[Report on interview with Colonel-General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the General Staff of Ground Forces, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] Following the signing of the agreement on reducing conventional armed forces in Europe, reports appeared in Western mass media claiming that the Soviet military are taking steps designed to bypass the Paris agreements. Our reporter has had a talk with the chief of the General Staff of the land force of the USSR, [Colonel-]General Mikhail Kolesnikov. He asked him of the Soviet Union really wanted to get certain units, tanks, and military equipment out of control by moving it secretly to the east, to the territory behind the Ural mountains. Here is what Gen. Kolesnikov replied:

When the agreement on conventional armed forces was in a state of preparation, Gen. Kolesnikov said, the Soviet Union provided all the necessary information required under the agreement’s terms. This information covered not only the armed forces and armaments that were subject to cuts, but also other arms and services. They included the information on the weaponry of the marine and coast defense units. They are part of the naval force and the naval force is known not to have been on the agenda of the talks. These units are armed with the same tanks and artillery systems as the land force is.

As for the reports about the alleged secret transfer of our equipment to the territory east of the Ural mountains, they fail to correspond to reality.

In the last three years we have considerably reduced the amount of weaponry in the Soviet Union's European part. Some of these weapons have been scrapped or readjusted for economic purposes. I must stress that all these measures had been carried out long before the signing of the agreement and outside its framework. And we made no secret of that. We violated no commitments, nor are we going to violate them in the future, Gen. Kolesnikov added.

Rumors continue circulating about what is termed as the Soviet Defense Ministry's uncompromising stand at the talks on the reduction of offensive strategic weapons being held by the Soviet Union and the United States in Geneva—Gen. Kolesnikov. [passage omitted]

As far as the allegedly uncompromising stand of the Soviet military at the talks is concerned, I'd like to note that while no 50 percent cut is envisaged either on the whole or in separate units in the American strategic force, the uncompromising Soviet military agreed to a 50 percent cut in their heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles and to about the same cut in the (?delivered) gross weight of our ballistic missile, the chief of the General Staff of the land force, Gen. Kolesnikov said in conclusion.

East Europe Troop Withdrawal Second Stage Complete

LD2712090290 Moscow TASS in English 0845 GMT 27 Dec 90

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, December 27 (TASS)—“The Soviet Union is scrupulously fulfilling its commitments to withdraw its troops from East European countries and Mongolia,” Colonel-General German Burutin, deputy head of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Main Department, told TASS in conjunction with the completion of the second stage in Soviet Troop withdrawal from Eastern Europe and Mongolia.

According to the general, about 200,000 personnel, 7,000 tanks, 4,000 artillery pieces, and 750 aircraft were moved out of Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Mongolia from 1987 to 1990, i.e. Since the withdrawal began.

“Over 44,000 officers and men, 1,078 tanks, 680 artillery pieces and 160 aircraft have already left the Southern Group of troops (Hungary),” Burutin said.

“About 57,000 personnel, 1,260 tanks, 1,060 artillery pieces and 80 aircraft will also be withdrawn from the Central Group of troops (Czechoslovakia) as scheduled,” Burutin stressed.

Only a quarter of the personnel and from 10 to 15 percent of the military hardware and equipment are left

on Czechoslovak territory, awaiting the complete withdrawal. The same number of personnel and from 15 to 20 percent of tanks, artillery pieces and aircraft remain in Hungary.

“The contingent of Soviet troops, remaining temporarily in Mongolia, will be moved out between 1991 and 1992 as planned,” Burutin noted.

“The third, last, stage in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia is sure to be carried out by July 1, 1991, as was agreed,” Burutin said.

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

U.S.-Soviet ‘Rapprochement’ on SNF Talks Seen

LD2012220590 Moscow TASS in English 2127 GMT 20 Dec 90

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, December 20 (TASS)—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vitaly Churkin told a briefing here today about the proposal to hold soon, perhaps in January 1991, Soviet-American consultations to decide on the concrete date for the beginning of negotiations on short-range nuclear arms (SNF) in Europe.

The problem of nuclear systems with a range up to 500 kilometers has long been viewed as the most difficult to solve at nuclear arms control talks.

After the Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of the medium and shorter range nuclear missiles was signed, Moscow proposed talks on short range nuclear weapons. Washington was categorically against the initiative. In April 1989, U.S. Defence Secretary Richard Cheney described this Soviet proposal as a dangerous trap and opposed the beginning of such negotiations in the near future. Washington announced plans to update land-based short range missiles in Western Europe in order to fill NATO defense gaps that appeared following the elimination of American Pershing-II missiles, however.

A paradoxical situation arose: the U.S. complained of Soviet superiority in land-based nuclear battle-field missiles but refused to level out the disparity through negotiations.

Washington's irreconcilable stand on tactical weapons and American plans to modernise nuclear missiles in Western Europe evoked discontent even among the leaders of some NATO countries, first of all Federal Germany. The issue of short-range nuclear weapons threatened to turn into an apple of discord in the ranks of Atlantists.

American diplomats kept saying that talks on short-range nuclear arms, once begun, would inevitably lead to their elimination under pressure from the world public

and—consequently—undermine the flexible response strategy based on the early nuclear strike concept.

Nothing endures under the moon, however. President George Bush eventually announced that time was ripe to discard some provisions of the flexible response doctrine following the change of the military-political situation in the world and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. Consequently, the U.S. standpoint on short-range nuclear arms began to change as well.

Washington gave up plans to modernise its Lance nuclear missiles and the nuclear artillery. The United States announced its readiness to begin talks on short-range nuclear weapons, but only after an agreement on conventional weapons was signed. Washington officials specified that negotiations should not aim at the complete elimination of short-range nuclear weapons proposed by the Soviet Union.

Moscow, in turn, made a few steps to facilitate mutually acceptable decisions on short-range nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union unilaterally and unconditionally withdrew 500 nuclear charges from Eastern Europe. During the Paris summit in November, President Mikhail Gorbachev announced the Soviet Union's readiness to move towards the elimination of short-range nuclear weapons stage by stage, without dramatising the differences as to the role of nuclear weapons in general.

NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner after the recent NATO Council session noted that all in Europe favoured resolute cuts in such weapons. He stressed that it would take NATO about six months to work out its own negotiation platform, however.

The disputed date for the beginning of talks is not the only difference the sides have as regards short-range nuclear weapons. Negotiators will have to look for mutually acceptable solutions to the problem of deployment of air-based nuclear weapons, the deadlines for the elimination of missiles and the future agreement verification procedures.

It is important to note the recent rapprochement of the standpoints by the sides as regards various problems relating to the short-range nuclear arms. This holds out a promise of the prompt beginning of negotiations.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Kazakhstan Bans Nuclear, CBW Testing

91US0126A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 28 Oct 90 p 1

["Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic adopted by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet on 25 October 1990"—KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA headline]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] 11. The Kazakh SSR independently determines the procedure and organization

for the protection of the ecological environment of the republic and the use of natural resources, ensures for the people ecological safety and has the right to prohibit construction and terminate the functioning on its territory of all enterprises, establishments, organizations, and other facilities which are a source of ecological danger.

Nuclear weapons testing and the construction and functioning of test ranges for other types of weapons of mass destruction (chemical, bacteriological, biological, and others) are banned on the territory of the republic.

The Kazakh SSR has the right to compensation for damage done to health of the population, the natural environment, and the economy of the republic by the actions of Union authorities, Union republics and other states and also the activity on its territory of nuclear and other test ranges and facilities of the military-industrial complex. [passage omitted]

13. The Kazakh SSR has the right to its own internal forces and state security and internal affairs authorities subordinate to and under the jurisdiction of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and the president of the Kazakh SSR.

The republic has the right, per agreement with the government of the Union, to determine the procedure and conditions of its citizens' performance of military service and to decide questions of the deployment of forces and arms on its territory. [passage omitted]

Kazakh President Warns Against Nuclear Testing

LD2312065790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 23 Dec 90

[Text] If the Ministry of Defense continues nuclear testing on the Semipalatinsk testing ground, then a political and social explosion could occur in the republic. Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev told this to an IAN correspondent while commenting on the statement made recently by USSR Defense Minister Yazov on the intention of the military department to continue nuclear tests, despite the declaration adopted in this republic on sovereignty which posed the question of closing the testing ground at Semipalatinsk.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

NATO, CSCE Conferences To Help Asian Security

LD1912202390 Moscow TASS in English 2004 GMT 19 Dec 90

[By TASS political analyst Askold Biryukov]

[Text] Moscow, December 19 (TASS)—A communique adopted by the NATO Council, the session of which ended on Tuesday, praised the latest events which became an important step towards the establishment of a just and stable peace order in Europe.

The Paris summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and unprecedented documents adopted by it feature prominently among these events.

The communique stresses that it is impossible today to ensure security only by military means. Therefore, NATO member-countries will continue expanding the alliance's political functions.

The communique shows that, on ending with the cold war in Europe and in the Atlantic zone, the states of the region intend to give priority in their relations to political means and to build them not on confrontation and division, as before, but on mutual respect, cooperation and equal security for all.

To push things in the right direction, they are creating appropriate mechanisms. The process of ensuring security and cooperation in Europe, no matter how important it seems to be, cannot be limited only to one continent, however.

Security is inseparable. The Gulf crisis has shown this with stark clarity. This is especially so, since this process cannot be limited to Europe on the vast expanses of the Eurasian continent.

It provoked a new round of discussion on ways of ensuring security in the Asian-Pacific region. Politicians and journalists in this region say that it is high time to test there what Europeans have put into practice.

In the opinion of the authors of an editorial recently published by the Japanese ASAHI newspaper, "The wave of detente generated by the European continent has reached Asia"

"Soviet-Chinese relations have been normalised, relations between the USSR and the United States are turning to detente. There are now states in Asia, the leadership of which speaks of the need to establish a collective security system of a European make."

Quoting a provision from the declaration signed in Moscow last Friday on general principles of relations between the USSR and South Korea that the two sides "are committed to the ideas of turning Asia and the Pacific into a region of peace and constructive cooperation through the process of bilateral and multilateral consultations", the newspaper regards the document as a rejection of old concepts of "alliances" and 'blocs'.

Another Japanese newspaper, YOMIURI, believes that the improvement of relations between the USSR and South Korea is a "decisive moment for creating a new system of peace and cooperation" in the region.

It is necessary to create a negotiating mechanism to begin the establishment of such a system. In his speech in Vladivostok, Mikhail Gorbachev put forth an idea of holding a Pacific conference with the participation of all countries adjacent to the ocean, which would resemble the Helsinki forum.

This idea was followed by a proposal made by Eduard Shevardnadze to hold a meeting of foreign ministers in Vladivostok in the autumn of 1993 to specify areas of a dialogue in the region.

There were proposals on decreasing tension, confidence-building measures, the establishment of permanent structures of security and cooperation in the North Pacific and others, which were set forth by Canada, Mongolia, North and South Korea and Australia.

The improvement of Soviet-American relations and the refusal of the USSR and the United States to regard each other enemies in this region, too, help create better climate in this area.

There is no need for Asian-Pacific countries to make an "Asian copy" of European structures of security and cooperation. At the same time, they can borrow much from the historical experience of European states and use their experience for their benefit.

Talks with PRC on Border Force Reductions End

'Friendly, Businesslike Atmosphere'

LD2112142290 Moscow TASS in English 1404 GMT
21 Dec 90

[Text] Beijing, December 21 (TASS)—A regular round of talks between Soviet and Chinese delegations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and implementation of military confidence-building measures along the Soviet-Chinese border were held in Beijing from November 30 to December 21. They were marked by a friendly and businesslike atmosphere. The sides discussed the components of the Armed Forces subject to reduction.

It was noted that the implementation of the agreement on principles guiding the mutual reduction of Armed Forces and strengthening military confidence along the Soviet-Chinese border contributed to the promotion of good-neighbourly relations between the two countries.

The Soviet delegation met Deputy Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei and Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel-General Xu Xin. The delegation visited the city of Guangzhou, where it was received by leaders of the Guangdong government and the Guangzhou military area.

It was agreed to hold the next round of talks in Moscow.

Chinese Foreign Ministry Comments

OW2212030990 Beijing XINHUA in English
0242 GMT 22 Dec 90

[Text] Beijing, December 22 (XINHUA)—Chinese and Soviet diplomatic and military experts held their second round of talks here between November 30 and December 21 on the implementation of the principles

guiding the reduction of military forces on the Sino-Soviet border and the strengthening of mutual trust in the military field.

According to sources from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the experts of the two sides discussed the contents of the reduction and shared the view that the implementation of the agreed principles would further promote the good-neighborly relations between the two countries.

The talks proceeded in an earnest and friendly atmosphere, the sources said.

During the talks, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei and deputy chief of the general staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army General Xu Xin met with the Soviet delegation on separate occasions.

Both sides agreed to hold their next talks in Moscow.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

NATO Accuses Soviets of Cheating on CFE Data*AU1812183590 Paris AFP in English 1825 GMT
18 Dec 90*

[Text] Brussels, December 18 (AFP) — The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) warned here Tuesday [18 December] that it suspected the Soviet Union of cheating in arms control talks and that this could delay ratification of an arms treaty.

In a communique issued at the end of their two-day meeting, NATO foreign ministers said they had "serious problems" with the figure provided by the Soviet Union of the armaments it has in Europe west of the Ural Mountains.

Under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty signed by NATO and Warsaw Pact countries last month, each side agreed on deep cuts in such heavy weapons as tanks, artillery and combat aircraft.

Under the treaty, according to Western military experts, the Soviet Union will have to destroy over nine times as many weapons as NATO countries.

But NATO has doubted Moscow's figures on Soviet arms falling under the treaty.

For example, where NATO expected that 2,000 military bases or weapons depots and 20,000 artillery pieces would be listed, the Soviet Union listed only 950 and 13,850 respectively.

The NATO communique said verification of the Soviet figures was essential for early ratification of the CFE treaty.

It pressed for a resumption of negotiations to establish "open skies" air verification of the CFE treaty. The talks have stalled because of disagreements between the two sides.

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said that the alliance had also complained that the Soviet Union had not counted weapons given to marine units on the grounds that the marines themselves were not included in the treaty.

BELGIUM

Coeme Proposes To Withdraw Troops from Germany by 1995*AU1312080290 Paris AFP in English 0304 GMT
13 Dec 90*

[Text] Brussels, December 13 (AFP)—Defense Minister Guy Coeme on Wednesday proposed to his government that Belgium withdraw all but 3,500 of the 25,000 troops it has stationed in Germany by 1995, according to a ministry statement.

Under the plan the remaining unit, the size of a brigade, would be stationed in the Cologne region.

The proposal is in line with a suggestion made in October by Belgian Army Commander in Chief General Jean Berhin. Gen. Berhin proposed a gradual troop pull-out, to be spread over five years and beginning next year.

FRANCE

Navy Escorts Greenpeace Out of Nuclear Test Zone*BK1112061490 Hong Kong AFP in English 0524 GMT
11 Dec 90*

[Text] Mururoa, French Polynesia, December 10 (AFP)—A Greenpeace dinghy which crossed into territorial waters around France's Mururoa nuclear testing site on Monday was halted by the French Navy and escorted back to its mother vessel, an AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE correspondent here said.

The dinghy sailed into the 12-mile (20-kilometer) limit around Mururoa atoll in defiance of French authorities, in a mission to check for radioactive contamination around the tested and non-violent, [as received] and had no intention of landing on the atoll itself.

The French Frigate Lieutenant De Vaisseau Lavallee, one of three vessels shadowing Rainbow Warrior II, warned the Greenpeace flagship several times that it and the inflatable boat were not to enter French waters.

Rainbow Warrior II was told by radio that should the team try to land at Mururoa or remain inside the 12-mile (20 kilometre) limit, they faced arrest and possible imprisonment.

Mr. Connan said before leaving the flagship: "We have to find out the truth about the (radioactive) damage to Mururoa and the only way to do that is to take samples in the lagoon itself."

France has conducted some 120 nuclear tests at Mururoa since it took its test program underground in 1975.

It has maintained a program averaging two series of four tests each year, with devices ranging from 30 kilotons to around 100 kilotons.

Greenpeace Mururoa Radioactivity Claim Dismissed*BK2012074490 Melbourne Overseas Service
in English 0500 GMT 20 Dec 90*

[Text] A French Government service which monitors radioactivity levels at the South Pacific nuclear test sites at Mururoa Atoll has denied there is any radioactivity in surrounding waters. It has accused the environmental group, Greenpeace, of staging a media stunt during its recent attempt to sail the Rainbow Warrior into the area.

The Radiological Security Joint Service in Papeete said it found neither Cobalt-60 or Cesium-134 in water samples taken 13 kilometers from the test site. This challenged claim by Greenpeace activist, (Norman Vorskii), who said he had found unspecified radioactive materials in water samples taken at the same distance from the atoll.

GERMANY

Scale of Ex-NVA Munitions Disposal Detailed

91GE0078A Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Oct 90 pp 76-77

[Article by Erhard Heckmann: "Munitions Disposal in the NVA [National People's Army]"]

[Text] In mid-August, at the invitation of the "Technical Disarmament" Department of the Ministry for Disarmament and Defense of the GDR, representatives of industrial firms of the FRG and of the former contract armament firms of the GDR met in Strausberg for the purpose of a briefing by representatives of the National People's Army [NVA] on the type and amount of munitions stocked by the NVA. An additional objective—it was hoped—was to discuss possible solutions to the disposal problem and to lay the groundwork for an industrial cooperation between East and West.

To get to the point without further ado: Stored in the GDR are 300,000 tons of munitions of various types, which must be stored, maintained, and disposed of. Peace has now reigned for 40 years in Europe, a peace marked by East-West confrontation, during which munitions were produced and stockpiled, even though in the West the NATO goal of a 28-day combat supply was, for many types of munitions, never attained. Not for a long time has there been this extended a period of peace, and it is this fact that has created the following problem: A production period of 40 years, on the one hand, is opposed by an average munitions storage capacity of 25 years, on the other. The problem of munitions destruction—without firing them at human beings and without harming the environment—has so far never come up. The whole problem complex of protecting and preserving the environment is now joined by munitions disposal as the most critical and most difficult, possibly also the costliest, neutralization of war materials. In the case of the munitions stockpiles of the NVA, the physical security of the existing depots is a critical problem, for only in this way can these hazardous "consumer goods" be prevented from falling into the wrong hands. The NVA representatives therefore spoke with concern about this problem area—especially since many conscripts are assigned to guard duties at depots, then claim after a few months to be conscientious objectors and go home. Additional problems are the across-the-board dismissal of NVA members who are over 55 years old and the deactivation of military units, which have resulted in a scarcity of trained personnel such as engineers and ordnance technicians.

The munitions of the NVA—including, among other things, missiles, grenades, explosives, and flare sets—are both centrally and locally stored. A greater centralization—which would simplify the security problem—is not possible for lack of available storage space and because of the security regulations in effect. Of special concern are the pyrotechnic munitions because of their shorter storage life and the danger of spontaneous firing.

The munitions consumers in the NVA are the commanders of the Missile and Military Technology Service, of the Air and Air Defense Forces, of the People's Navy, of the Combat Engineers, and of the Chemical Services.

The overall supply of munitions in the NVA—as mentioned above—is circa 300 kilotons. Of these, circa 45 kilotons are explosives. The investment value of these supplies is approximately 13 billion German marks [DM]. Based on past experiences and careful estimates, the costs of disposing of these munitions is estimated at 1 billion to 1.4 billion DM.

What Disposal Method Is To Be Used?

A certain amount of information has already been gathered from past experience about the disposal of munitions in the NVA, but the procedures used can hardly be applied because of environmental protection considerations and the relevant time-frames. These are as follows:

- Annealing of cartridges and munitions components.
- Detonation at firing ranges.
- Combustion of explosive charges in projectiles.
- Firing munitions from weapons systems.
- Open-air combustion.

Environmentally friendly, to be sure, are procedures such as

- Fusing of explosives.
- Removal of compressed explosives.
- Disassembly of munitions; but these cannot be applied to all types of munitions, however, and they require the subsequent disposal of the explosives. The munitions stocks of the NVA are given in the accompanying table. What is remarkable are the many different types of munitions, a result of the fact that they stem not only from the NVA but also from workers' militia forces, border troops, the Ministry for State Security, and other security organs. What is required, therefore, are industrial disposal capabilities on the territory of the present-day GDR. To be included in this process are the munitions plants still in existence in the GDR and the munitions facilities utilized by the NVA. With the creation of a suitable infrastructure, further scientific exploration of the disposal problem also becomes essential. From the standpoint of the NVA, the following are perceived as the focal points:

- Handling of explosives and hazardous chemical substances;
- Treatment and subsequent utilization of such residual products as heavy metal compounds, oxides of nitrogen, etc.;
- Further utilization by the civilian sector of the explosives obtained;
- Further utilization of internal components as well as packing materials.

Munitions Stocks of the NVA

Munitions Category	Number of Munitions Types	Total Quantity (in tons)
Infantry Weapons	92	58,600
Artillery and Mortars	87	52,900
Rocket Launchers	6	23,600
Air Defense Artillery and Self-Propelled Antiaircraft Artillery	17	21,800
Tanks, APC's [Armored Personnel Carriers], Infantry Combat Vehicles	63	66,000
Antitank Weapons	12	18,000
Antitank Guided Missiles	8	1,500
Short-Range Air Defense Guided Missiles	4	500
Hand Grenades	9	8,000
Other Munitions Components	25	3,000
Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles	3	4,378
Of these, 750 short-range missiles with 900 kg of explosives, 200 medium-range missiles with 1,700 kg of explosives, and 130 long-range missiles with 7,000 kg of explosives.		
Air-to-Air Guided Missiles (total of 17,564)	10	2,429
Air-to-Surface Guided Missiles (total of 711)	7	406
Unguided Rockets (177,346 small and 473 large)	8	1,656
Bombs	15	1,290
Onboard Munitions	5	886
Ship's Artillery and Air Defense Systems	5	2,909
Naval Mines	6	2,208
Depth Charges	2	1,785
Large-Capacity Charges/components (850,000 AT [Antitank] Mines)	5	685
Combat Engineer Munitions (500,000 Off-Route Antitank Missiles, 100,000 Cutting and Shaped Charges)	66	16,000
Flare Sets:		
Illumination and Signal Means	68	6,000

Smoke Generating Units	3	760
Other Smoke Units	6	138
Total	532	295,430

For munitions types and flare sets which exist only in relatively small numbers, a disposal outside the GDR is planned as well.

Competitive bids are planned for the disposal of munitions. The following conditions are to be observed in this disposal:

1. Destruction to begin as soon as possible.
2. Implementation to take place on the territory of the present-day GDR.
3. Labor to be provided primarily by what is currently the NVA (social component).
4. Complete and non-indemnified destruction of all materials and their sales.
5. Acceptance of the military materiel on no more than a zero-cost basis.

The Missile and Weapons-Technical Service of the NVA maintains its own laboratory where it also examines the composition of munitions by age, technical structure, and security regulations. The first steps toward an ecological disposal have been taken. According to findings made thus far, the propellant charges are in a safe condition. There are 85 types of fuzes, with only short-range antiaircraft missiles being equipped with electronic fuzes, however. A melting facility was put into operation in the year 1984, and 2,900 tons of 21 types of munitions were processed in 1990. With respect to surface-to-air missiles, 90 percent are imports, most of them from the USSR. Technical documentation is non-existent. Nor was such documentation ever requested, since no production under license was planned. Here a precise analysis of the composition would be necessary prior to destruction. The munitions, without exception, are safe to transport and handle. The sequence of disposal would be dictated by the end of the storage stability, and here no action needs to be taken until 1993.

Munitions of the Air Force

All guided missiles and unguided rockets, all aircraft bombs, aircraft armament, and pyrotechnic munitions are imported, 95 percent of them from the Soviet Union. For their handling and storage, Soviet directives apply. The munitions are hermetically packed in special containers. Of these, 35 percent are assigned to the "aircraft technology" branch, i.e., they are not yet stored at wing-level depots. Their total mass is 6,667 tons. The NVA has at its disposal 17,564 air-to-air missiles of ten different types and a total weight of 2,429 tons, 711 air-to-surface missiles of seven types with a total weight of 406 tons, 177,346 small unguided rockets of eight types and a total weight of 1,656 tons, 473 large unguided rockets, 15 types of air-dropped bombs with a

weight of 1,290 tons and five types of onboard aircraft ammunition with a weight of 886 tons.

With respect to air defense missiles, the NVA has at its disposal 750 short-range missiles with a total of 900 kg of explosives, 200 medium-range surface-to-air missiles with 1,700 kg of explosives, and 130 long-range missiles with 7 tons of explosives. Aircraft armament ammunition of calibers up to 37 mm has a mechanical impact fuze and a provision for self-destruction. The warheads of the surface-to-air missiles can only be destroyed by blowing them up, since no documentation exists. Initial disposal efforts were made in Poland with antiship guided missiles.

Combat engineer munitions include 850,000 antitank mines, 500,000 off route antitank missiles, and 100,000 cutting and shaped charges. The arsenal of engineering munitions also includes antipersonnel mines such as bouncing mines and other similar mines. Engineer munitions are in part produced domestically and in part imported from the USSR, the CSFR, Bulgaria, and Poland. The explosive used is primarily TNT. Engineer weapons are divided into hazard groups and transport hazard groups.

Among industrial firms in the FRG, the Buck firm has taken a lead position, and began already some time ago to address the problem of munitions disposal and to make suitable contacts in the GDR.

Dr. Volk of the Fraunhofer Institute said the following with respect to the thermal decomposition of munitions: "...By thermal decomposition, by burning at ambient temperature and burning under higher pressure, i.e., by utilizing calorimetric bombs, and by detonation. All emotional argumentation notwithstanding, it is a fact that expending the explosives by means of practice firing is ecologically considerably more gentle than burning them, by a ratio of 1:5,000 per shot." Dr. Magenheimer of the Buck firm spoke of the difficulties posed by legal directives for the disposal of munitions. A quick munitions disposal/destruction program cannot be reckoned with, since the process of getting approval for disposal facilities takes between 12 and 16 months to complete, and, according to him, there is no disposal plan in existence for dealing with magnitudes such as 75,000 tons of TNT.

Dr. Schmidt of Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm [MBB], Schrobenhausen, spoke about a concept of confined burning and purification of the exhaust gases through afterburning in a liquid iron bath. In doing so, he put forward a practical proposal for the erection of a disposal center in the GDR, where the structures, facilities, transportation means, and personnel would be provided locally, and MBB would take care of the financing, the know-how, the management, the technology, and the logistics.

Also on the lookout for partners in the GDR for the purpose of working out a disposal plan within a short time is the firm Rheinmetall.

Industrial enterprises of the GDR—most of them contract firms of the defense and economics ministries—especially bemoaned the fact that all orders were cancelled as of 30 September. The firm Inpar Pinnow GmbH (Inpar=Instandsetzungs- und Lizenzproduktionsswerk von Lenk Waffen [Repair and Licensed Production Plant for Guided Weapons]), for example, had 1,600 employees; total sales last year were DM350 million, with sales for another DM88 million being realized this year; orders for the second half of the year totaled DM30 million; what was immediately directed was an abbreviated working schedule for 1,400 employees. Not mentioned during the meeting was the fact that GDR contract firms, like almost all industrial firms in the GDR, are overmanned and were forced to take on support tasks for extended-service NVA members and other security forces. What most of these firms have in common, as well, is that they have considerable real estate at their disposal.

A new expression to replace the hackneyed word "conversion" was heard from the chemical plant Kaden: one spoke of a "redefinition."

Disarmament Monitoring Satellite Plans Advanced

91GE0077A Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHEN in German 16 Nov 90 pp 32-35

[Article by Friedrich Thelen: "Beyond the Urals: Plans for a German Satellite—Instead of Fighter Aircraft, German Industry Should Build Instruments to Control Disarmament in the Future"]

[Text] The Americans were angry, and Bonn officials knew nothing about it—at least officially. Washington presented precise information to the German government about the construction of the Rabta poison gas factory in Libya, in which Germans participated. An embarrassing affair which burdened German-American relations in early 1989. It was also an important lesson for the politicians on the Rhine: in the high-tech age, high-priced systems for the observation of possible enemies are at least as important as weapons to oppose them.

Gradually, that was being said among the arms suppliers, too. They live in a tough world now that Europe has disarmed, the East Bloc has broken up, and arms programs costing billions such as the Fighter 90 aircraft threaten to become relics of a terrible, earlier age. Even if the Fighter 90 project made a crash landing—with consequences for contract books and jobs—a satellite system could arise in its place: In a couple weeks, experts from the Bundeswehr and the German Intelligence Service will present the Bonn Chancellor's Office with their study on German reconnaissance satellites. The satellite fans use the end of the cold war precisely as their argument. Observation of the other side is, according to the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] Bundestag representative Juergen Ruettgens, "needed in the sense of

insuring peace." More sensible than the battle being waged by Federal Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg over every tank to be scrapped would be the acquisition of a system with which it could be determined what the Red Army is doing with the thousands of tanks which it is currently withdrawing behind the Urals to Siberia.

For Lutz Stavenhagen, the minister of state in the Chancellor's Office, observation has already replaced hardware in defense: That is also gradually being said in the Federal Defense Ministry. Only in the budget is there no trace of it. There is still a lack of "new thinking" on the part of the decisionmakers, complains a major general on the Armed Forces command staff.

It is not just the weapons-hungry rockheads who have no need for the German observation satellite. Minister of Research Heinz Riesenhuber does not want to support a military or, indeed, an intelligence service space project. Even in the Chancellor's Office, where Stavenhagen is responsible for the intelligence services, there are reservations about the project of the German Aerospace Agency (Dasa), in which MBB is considerably involved.

"For heaven's sake, call the thing an earth observation satellite," the Dasa people are told: That sounds more like geography than espionage. The proposed satellite is officially called Atmos, and is not just supposed to be for inspecting Russian disarmament, but should also observe weather, protect the environment, warn farmers of catastrophes, and inform geologists. The wealth of functions remotely reminds people of evil creations of earlier arms programs, but an "observation system which only offers intelligence and verification functions" is, according to Stavenhagen, "not acceptable in the current political situation."

But what sense is there in an expensive German solo effort? The French have been calling on the Germans for years to participate in their parallel program, Helios II. Of course, at least in Ruetters' opinion, the Germans would have only been the financiers and sheet metal workers who would have had little to do with the development and fabrication of the important parts.

That is why the Bonn policymakers are looking for partners in the context of the West European Union [WEU], perhaps also the European Community. Atmos would cost about 1.3 billion German marks [DM] in a so-called budget version—a lot of money, even if it is considerably less than the probably condemned Fighter 90 with its seven billion mark developmental costs.

The comparison is important with respect to Daimler Benz AG [Inc.], which also belongs to Dasa. Chairman of the board Edzard Reuter received solid promises from Helmut Kohl before he took over the MBB [Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm] aerospace firm. The Federal Chancellor guaranteed him, among other things, the contracts for the construction of the Fighter 90 as well as the Franco-German anti-tank helicopter PAH 2. Therefore, the German government and Daimler Benz would have to quickly determine whether or not to break off the

Fighter 90 development phase set to continue until 1999, and to reassign the approximately 3,500 engineers from aircraft to satellite development. This is because the decision to go into production absolutely must be made by 1992 because of the later series production requirements.

The rearguard actions of the Fighter 90 supporters do not carry much weight any more. The development of a fighter aircraft probably brings less technological knowledge useful in other fields—the oft-proclaimed spin-off effect—than the work on a new satellite. The fear of high contractual penalties if the fighter project is broken off also does not scare Bonn any more. The project has become far too expensive for the Italian partners anyway. And the British would rather continue to work on this costly fighter without the Germans, in any case, because the German restrictions on arms exports, soon to be even stricter, would probably only interrupt worldwide export of the fighter aircraft. Participating British firms such as the engine manufacturers, Rolls Royce, and MTU [Motoren- und Turbinen-Union], would also be able to sell their turbines for installation in other aircraft. At the Daimler subsidiary, Dasa, officially, the strict rule against saying anything negative about the Fighter 90 is still in force. In reality, preparations are being made for the changeover. The opposing side already knows that, even without the help of an observation satellite. He just wanted to know, "how it is going with the ground observation satellite," as a MBB spokesman announced some time ago. The guest came from the Soviet secret service, the KGB. His curiosity can be allayed: Bonn also wants to cooperate with Moscow in the satellite business, and a special camera fabricated in Germany is already orbiting the earth with the Soviet spaceship Mir.

The American government does not like that at all.

Major Arms Maker Feeling Disarmament Pinch

91GE0097A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 30 Nov 90 p 20

[Article by js.: "Rheinmetall Forced to Scale Back: Elimination of One Thousand Jobs Planned"]

[Text] Rheinmetall GmbH [company with limited liability], Duesseldorf—"We must in the very near future concentrate on bringing our capacity and personnel into line with the new security-political demand," said the managing director of the armament firm, Raimund Germershausen, following a board of directors meeting at which the consequences of disarmament for the firm were discussed. Germershausen announced that the company would be forced to release circa 1000 employees in Duesseldorf by 1993. The mechanical production of parts and assemblies is to be relocated from Duesseldorf to Unterlues in Lower Saxony, thus releasing for another form of utilization 180,000 square meters of real estate located in the best part of the city.

Germershausen emphasized that, despite disarmament, military technology would continue to be a focal point of the enterprise's activity. For that reason the company would enter into a partnership with the MaK System-Gesellschaft mbH [with limited liability] in Kiel, a company into which Krupp also plans to introduce the "Military Technology—Ground" department of the Krupp MaK Maschinenbau GmbH. In this way, the level of competence in the development and production of military technology systems for the ground forces is to be bolstered.

The new company, MaK System-Gesellschaft mbH, will have a labor force of approximately 650 to 700 employees and a yearly turnover of 350 million German marks [DM]. In addition, for the protection of the firm and its employees, an intensification is planned of cooperative ventures with international partners, including Giat Industries in France and Royal Ordnance in Great Britain.

Circa 2,800 people are currently employed by Rheinmetall. The company still has orders on hand valued at DM2 billion, the fulfillment of which will extend to the mid-1990's, however. Although this figure is the approximate equivalent of the turnover for two years, a decline in sales can nevertheless be expected in the coming year already, a decline which will continue at an accelerated rate in the years thereafter.

Disarmament Control Center To Open 1 April

LD1312094590 Berlin ADN in German 0434 GMT
13 Dec 90

[Text] Munich (ADN)—The Center for Verification Tasks of the Bundeswehr in the Selfkant garrison in Geilenkirchen, near Aachen, is to be ready for use from 1 April. SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG reports today that the center for monitoring the observation of disarmament agreements will eventually have 390 workers, including 280 soldiers and 110 civilians. The branch office of the former GDR Ministry of Disarmament and Defense will also be put under control of the center in April.

The tasks of the center arise from the treaty on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe, which was negotiated after 18 months of talks between the 22 states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in Vienna and signed on 19 November at the CSCE special summit in Paris. In this connection, the Bundeswehr is in charge of practical implementation of the monitoring regulations on the German side. It will, for example, put together data for exchanges of information, evaluate information sent by participating states, prepare inspection trips in their own country, or supervise the destruction of military equipment in other countries. The verification is to be guided politically by the Foreign Ministry, the newspaper reports. The commissioner for disarmament issues, Ambassador Josef Holik, will chair a "steering committee" to be formed along with the Defense Ministry. All

verification measures are to be discussed in the committee and made into "targets".

The Bundestag has set aside DM25 million in the third supplementary budget for the "initial establishment" of the center, where the Pershing missile squadron No. 2 was recently stationed. Things which will be needed for the center include mobile radio telephones, computers, cameras, and vehicles of various size and type.

Newspaper Alleges Secret U.S. Poison Gas Depot

AU1412154990 Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 14 Dec 90 p 8

["cas" report: "United States Did Not Tell Bonn About Poison Gas Depot in Palatinate"]

[Text] Bonn—According to its own statements, the FRG Government has known only since October 1990 that the U.S. Army had a secret depot for chemical combat agents in the FRG at the end of the 1950's. It was in Gerbach in Rhineland-Palatinate, which contained hundreds of tonnes of nerve gas at that time and was cleared later. Officially, the government knew only about the depot in Clausen, whose stocks have been removed over the past few months, it was said in a letter from Willy Wimmer (Christian Democratic Union), state secretary in the Defense Ministry, to Greens' Deputy Angelika Beer.

Problems Scrapping NVA SS-23 Missiles Noted

AU2412133190 Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 22-23 Dec 90 p 6

["ub" report: "Bundeswehr Has Soviet Missiles"]

[Text] Bonn—The Bundeswehr not only has modern MiG-29 combat planes from Soviet production but also has 24 SS-23 intermediate-range missiles, which should have been scrapped long ago, according to the INF treaty between Washington and Moscow. At the beginning of next year, negotiations between Bonn and Moscow about "disposal" will start.

The modern SS-23 missiles, which have a range of more than 500 km, were given to the then GDR National People's Army [NVA] at the beginning of the 1980's. The West learned about this only when the Modrow Government reported the availability of the missiles to Bonn at the beginning of March 1990. These so-called SRINF missiles (Strictly speaking, they are short-range missiles, which, however, have an intermediate range between 500 and 5,500 km) were not included in the U.S.-Soviet agreement on land-based intermediate-range missiles. The 24 missiles with four launch systems were equipped with conventional warheads.

Last summer the GDR Government asked Moscow to destroy the missiles in Soviet facilities. Moscow refused with regret because the facilities for the destruction of Soviet intermediate-range missiles are already out of

operation and have been removed. The Soviets suggested that the GDR should ask the United States. It would do no harm if the United States convinced itself of the high technical level at which Soviet missiles are produced. But the United States, too, has already scrapped its intermediate-range missiles that are covered by the treaty. The deadline expired in November.

Now new negotiations have to be held with the Soviet Union, because in Moscow—obviously within the military—there are reservations about whether it is advisable to leave modern missiles to the Americans. It is certain that the scrapping, which is not possible in the FRG “for reasons of environmental protection,” as it is said, will be expensive, because the Soviets have to build new facilities for this purpose. German inspectors will have to be present at the “disposal.” Otherwise—it is thought—there might arise the suspicion that the Soviet Union has again acquired SS-23 missiles, which would suggest the violation of the INF Treaty with the United States.

NORWAY

Impact of CFE Agreement on Tanks Detailed

91EN0137A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
20 Nov 90 p 7

[Article by Olav Trygve Storvik: “Soviets Counting Norwegian Weapons”—first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] Thirty-five Norwegian tanks of the M48 Chaffee type must be destroyed as a result of the disarmament agreement that was signed yesterday in Paris. At the same time, the Defense Supreme Command must stand ready to receive a considerable number of Soviet inspector teams that are to monitor the mobilization stockpiles in this country.

This came out of a joint briefing that Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst and Chief of Defense Torolf Rein held yesterday for appropriate Norwegian authorities concerning the concrete consequences of the agreement. These details had been completely unknown until the last moment.

Greater Security

According to Holst, the disarmament agreement is the most comprehensive one that has been concluded. He believes it will lead to greater security for Norway as well, and that the agreement ushers in a new time in which the danger of a surprise attack has been eliminated and new mutual security arrangements are being built up.

The agreement encompasses the following categories of weapons systems: tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, combat planes, and combat helicopters. For all these categories, Norway has a smaller number than the “ceiling” that has been set as the maximum number

according to the agreement. Only with regard to tanks does Norway have a little larger number, 205, as opposed to the maximum allowed, 170.

Norway must therefore destroy 35 tanks as a result of the treaty, and these will probably be the relatively light M48 Chaffee tanks, of which there are 70 in the mobilization stockpiles. They were produced during the Second World War and were received as a part of American weapons assistance after the war. But all the same, it is not some museum piece that Norway must get rid of. The Chaffee tank has been greatly modernized in the course of recent years, with a new motor, a new canon, and sighting devices, and is very suitable for the tasks for which it was conceived.

Soviets Know

Yesterday in Paris, the Norwegian side handed over detailed information to all the 22 countries that have signed the agreement concerning what holdings there are in Norway of the weapons encompassed by the agreement, which units have the weapons, and where in Norway they are located. From the overview that the Defense Supreme Command presented yesterday, it became known that the weapons are held by 51 units and that they are stockpiled at 54 different places in the country. Which places these are, is being kept secret from the Norwegian public, even though this has been provided to Soviet authorities with detailed map references. The grounds given for the secrecy is that terrorists should not get hold of undesirable information.

The agreement will not go into effect until the national parliaments in all the 22 countries have approved it, but they figure at the Foreign Ministry that this will happen during the first half of 1991. In the meantime, the Defense Supreme Command is in full swing preparing itself both to receive inspections and to send out its own monitoring teams to the Soviet Union. In all, six inspection groups have now been organized and are taking courses to prepare themselves for the assignment. There are three teams in the South Norway Defense Command (FKS) and three teams in the North Norway Defense Command (FKN), and each team consists of four officers and two interpreters.

When all the countries have ratified the agreement, Norway must stand ready to receive Soviet officers who are to travel around to units and mobilization stockpiles throughout the entire country in order to monitor that the information that was provided by Norwegian authorities yesterday is in fact in agreement with what the inspectors can confirm for themselves on the spot. The inspection arrangements in connection with the agreement are very complicated, but it is certain that Norway will have to accommodate a significant number; indications are for 10-11 inspections in the course of two 120-day periods, and 7-8 annual inspections as long as the agreement is in force.

“Access for inspectors implies a right to an extensive inside view. This will require changes both in regulations

and attitudes regarding the keeping of secrets on the part of all partners to the agreement, and in Norway as well," the Defense Minister reported yesterday.

Progress Party Worried

The Progress Party's Hans. J. Rosjorde, as leader of the Storting Defense Committee, is alarmed by one of the foreign minister's comments concerning the disarmament agreement. A press release from the Foreign Ministry yesterday states: "The CFE agreement is a milestone in Europe's postwar history.... In flank areas as well, those concerned have grounds to reckon with significant force reductions."

"I am assuming that Thorvald Stoltenberg is thinking of Norway here, and I would like to have an explanation of the details of this assertion," says Rosjorde. As far as Kola and nearby Norwegian areas go, this disarmament agreement means approximately nothing. From what I know, no Soviet disarmament is taking place on Kola; rather to the contrary. In addition, we have to obligate ourselves to accept a series of Soviet inspections. The superpower can make use of this insight in a completely different way than we can if political conditions suddenly change. I believe that this agreement first and foremost attends to the interests of the countries in Central Europe," says Rosjorde.

Bosterud's Stance on Minimum Defense Viewed

91EN0166D Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
3 Dec 90 p 6

[Commentary by Olav Trygve Storvik: "Changed Line on Minimum Defense?"]

[Text] The Defense Committee's deputy chairman, the Labor Party's Helen Bosterud, represented one of the most interesting political signals in Saturday's defense debate when she firmly distanced herself from use of the expression "minimum defense."

The expression has, for a time, been at the very center of the defense debate. Who was the first to introduce its use is not known. This is also immaterial, but the word has first and foremost been used as a tool by defense-friendly forces: Professional military, politicians from many parties, and others who have wished to get it out that the Norwegian defense forces find themselves at a level which it is difficult to reduce. Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst has also made use of the "minimum defense" formulation, even if this now lies a little back in time.

But during the defense debate on Saturday, Helen Bosterud firmly distanced herself from the expression

"minimum defense" and, thereby, indirectly from the perception of reality that lies behind this expression. The language usage is interesting, because it indicates that an attempt is now being made to create an entirely new premise for viewing the Norwegian defense forces. If this is not a "minimum defense," then what is it?

"It seems to me that those who use this concept are conveying confused reasoning," said Bosterud. "A country's defense requirement is determined by the sum of the threat that faces the country at any time. This sum is, of course, not constant. In reality, it is meaningless to speak about a 'minimum defense' without putting this into relationship with a particular threat. The process of detente between East and West has reduced the threat against Norway appreciably, or, in positive terms: Our security is increased. Out of consideration for elementary clarity in our defense debate, I think we should avoid the expression 'minimum defense.' Seen in isolation, it is meaningless and demagogic," she said.

Threat Picture

There is much that is correct in Bosterud's criticism. The word is meaningless so long as it is not measured against "something." It can also be used in a demagogic way. On the other side, Bosterud refrains from mentioning that neither the Labor Party or different governments have ever measured defense in relation to the threat. In any case, not so long as this was increasing. The would have been accompanied by a good deal larger budgets. Now, with a slightly different international situation, it is possibly advantageous from an economic viewpoint to tie the defense level to a political perception of the threat.

Many will also find it somewhat remarkable that it is precisely now, right after the CFE disarmament agreement, that the Labor Party's deputy chairman of the Defense Committee is speaking about against use of the expression "minimum defense" in Norway. While the agreement enjoins most countries, not the least the Soviet Union, to disarm energetically, the agreement establishes that the Norwegian defense forces do not, by a long shot, come up against the "ceiling" which the agreement sets for important weapons systems. This pertains to aircraft, artillery, and armored vehicles. Thirty tanks are all that Norway is ordered to destroy, and even that, to be sure, is a number that has been arrived at more from considerations of political convenience than from military realities.

All countries in Europe, including the Soviet Union, have thus signed on that Norway's defense forces lie far beneath the level which they have accepted. But, according to Bosterud, we should nevertheless not use the expression "minimum defense."

PORTUGAL

CFE Cascading, National Defense Discussed

91ES0202C Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 2 Nov 90
p 13

[Article by Herminio Santos; first paragraph is O JORNAL introduction]

[Excerpts] Beginning next year, the "cascade" will go into operation: A large portion of the military equipment withdrawn from Central Europe will be used to modernize forces in the peripheral countries. Portugal has already announced that it is a candidate.

"Cascading" has become a magic word for Portuguese strategists and military men. It is through that process that the Armed Forces—and chiefly the Army—want to carry out a thorough modernization of their equipment. Beginning as early as next year, for example, Portugal is going to acquire helicopters, tanks, armored personnel carriers, aircraft, and towed and self-propelled artillery pieces.

Our country has already announced the equipment that it wants to buy or receive under the terms of the CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] agreement on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe. That "package" of equipment may include about 100 M60 tanks, 40 Alpha Jet aircraft that were about to be transferred to our country by the FRG in exchange for its use of the Beja base and are intended to replace the fleet of FIATS, and more modern versions of the M113 vehicles. [passage omitted]

Data from 1989 revealed the future scenario for the Armed Forces of the two countries on the Iberian Peninsula. At that time, Portugal and Spain had 1,020 tanks, or 20 more than recommended by NATO. Because of that very fact, our country would have to retire three tanks and Spain seven [figures as published]. The two countries had 1,560 artillery pieces (1,276 in the neighboring country and 284 in our country), or 160 more than recommended, with the result that Spain would have to destroy 130 and Portugal 30. The situation with armored vehicles was different, however, because the total for both countries did not exceed 1,961.

The result is that Spain will be allowed 36 more, and Portugal can have three more. [passage omitted]

Portuguese Strategy

The principles agreed upon as part of the CFE agreement will be decisive as regards Portugal's defense strategy. Characterizing a new threat and redefining the force structure have been the main concerns of the military establishment, some of which advocates paying special attention to the "Arab peril." But not everyone in

political circles feels that way. Medeiros Ferreira, for example, feels that we are in a transitional phase calling for "some prudence in reformulating doctrine." In his opinion, we may even be going through a phase "devoid of enemies."

At a press conference held last week, General Vigleik Eide, chairman of the NATO Military Committee, said he completely rejected the "assumption that it is necessary to have an identified enemy." The Atlantic Alliance itself has been a victim of its own "resounding" political victory and is now seeking new justification for its existence. In Medeiros Ferreira's opinion, Portugal must remain in the alliance, but it is important that the alliance not fear "the renationalization of defense systems in its countries."

The proposed revision of the strategic concept of national defense that was presented by the Socialist Party's parliamentary group last week aims at keeping Portugal "in collective security systems"—that is, the WEU [West European Union], NATO, the conference on the reduction in conventional forces (CFE), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the recently established Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM).

Air defense, naval patrols, and the capability for reinforcement and rapid intervention at any point in the national territory will be the basic features of the new military defense component. Acquisition of the F-16's and the coming of the Chaparral missiles, which arrived in Santa Margarida and at other Army training centers last week and which were included in the Military Planning Law now in effect, may be part of that new defense model. Under the terms of that same law, the Stinger missiles are to arrive at the start of next year.

The government has been saying all this year that it is going to amend the National Defense Law and draw up a new Military Planning Law that will authorize the expenditure of 25 million centos per year on modernizing and reequipping the Armed Forces. It has even announced the holding of the National Defense Seminar. Moreover, Minister Fernando Nogueira has established a "think tank" that has limited itself to theoretical discussions of the latest developments in the Gulf crisis and the situation in Europe.

But various sources contacted by O JORNAL expressed some surprise at the slow progress of the entire process, because major reform of the national defense system is dependent upon those decisions. The Socialist Party's initiative can be seen as a move to anticipate the government's proposals. A senior officer in the Armed Forces even felt that, at present, there are no "definite strategic objectives." We have already been in the "Moroccan phase" and the "European phase," and now "it seems that we are in the African phase."

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